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CARL F. MINZNER*
China's Turn Against Lawt
Chinese authorities are reconsidering legal reforms they enacted
in the 1980s and 1990s. These reforms had emphasized law, litiga-
tion, and courts as institutions for resolving civil disputes between
citizens and administrative grievances against the state. But social
stability concerns have led top leaders to question these earlier re-
forms. Central Party leaders now fault legal reforms for insufficiently
responding to (or even generating) surging numbers of petitions and
protests.
Chinese authorities have drastically altered course. Substan-
tively, they are de-emphasizing the role of formal law and court
adjudication. They are attempting to revive pre-1978 court mediation
practices. Procedurally, Chinese authorities are also turning away
from the law. They are relying on political, rather than legal, levers in
their effort to remake the Chinese judiciary.
This Article analyzes the official Chinese turn against law.
These Chinese developments are not entirely unique. American
courts have also experienced a broad shift in dispute resolution pat-
terns over the last century. Litigation has fallen out of favor. Court
trials have dropped in number. Alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms have increased. Observing such long-term patterns, Marc
Galanter concluded that the United States experienced a broad "turn
against law" over the twentieth century.
China's shift also parallels those in other developing countries. In
recent decades, nations such as India, Indonesia, and the Philippines
have resuscitated or formalized traditional mediation institutions.
This is part of a global reconsideration of legal norms and institutions
imported or transplanted from the West.
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Cardozo, Ford-
ham, Jiaotong University, Washington University in St. Louis, NYU, University of
Michigan, University of North Carolina, and the Yale China Law Center for organiz-
ing conferences and workshops at which this paper was presented, and to all
participants and commentators. Particular thanks are due to Don Clarke, Debbie
Denno, Frances Foster, Paul Gewirtz, Keith Hand, Tom Kellogg, Tom Lee, Ben Lieb-
man, Carol Liebman, Maggie Lewis, Sida Liu, Greg Magarian, Ethan Michelson,
Randall Peerenboom, Jeffrey Prescott, Ben Read, Rana Siu, Kent Syverud, Brian
Tamanaha, Glenn Tiffert, Melissa Waters, and others in China. All errors are those of
the author. Unless otherwise noted all translations are by the author.
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Despite these similarities with global trends, this Article argues
that Chinese leaders' shift against law is a distinct domestic political
reaction to building pressures within the Chinese system. It is a top-
down authoritarian response motivated by social stability concerns.
This Article analyzes the risks facing China as a result of the shift
against law. It argues that the Chinese leadership's concern with
maintaining social stability in the short term may be having severe
long-term effects-undermining Chinese legal institutions and desta-
bilizing the country.
Finally, this Article argues for rethinking the trajectory of Chi-
nese legal studies. Scholars need to shift away from focusing on
formal Chinese law and legal institutions in order to understand how
the Chinese legal system actually operates and to recognize the direc-
tion in which it is heading.
RAMETX iif - I hope for a world without litigation.
Judge Chen Yanping'
INTRODUCTION
In the early twenty-first century, Chinese authorities turned
against law.
What does this mean?
Similarities exist with the American "turn against law" over the
twentieth century, as characterized by Marc Galanter.2 Trial rates
are declining. Court presidents and administrators are expressing a
new official preference for mediation, rather than adjudication. Sus-
picion of lawyers has risen. A new narrative has emerged which
views litigation as a pathology to be cured, and law as cold and unre-
sponsive to human needs.
The Chinese shift has a broader component as well. Procedur-
ally, Party authorities are relying on political levers to remold the
Chinese judiciary. Chinese authorities are altering financial and pro-
motion standards facing judges in order to steer them toward
mediating, rather than adjudicating, cases. Party propaganda au-
thorities are presenting Chinese courts and judges with an official
depiction of their roles that is a dramatic reversal of the emphasis on
judicial professionalism prevalent in the 1990s. These trends are
playing out against the background of Party political campaigns that
are reasserting tighter control over the Chinese judiciary, cracking
1. Ou Qinping, Sanwu faguan yuan tianxia wusong [The "Three No's Judge"
Seeks World Without Litigation], Jan. 18, 2010, available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/
GB/64093/64104/10788439.html.
2. Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Ac-
countability, 81 TEx. L. REv. 285 (2002).
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down on public interest lawyers, and attempting to curtail the influ-
ence of foreign rule-of-law norms among Chinese judges and officials.
The official Chinese turn against law, and back toward media-
tion, is thus tied to a politicized rejection of many legal reforms
advanced in the 1980s and 1990s. It is a part of a broader reconsider-
ation of role of law, lawyers, courts, and adjudication. This Article
analyzes these shifts by examining Chinese judiciary's treatment of
civil and administrative grievances-the centerpiece of earlier legal
and court reform efforts.
Such statements are subject to important caveats. Law has not
been abandoned in China. State authorities continue to issue stat-
utes and regulations. Citizens and corporations continue to invoke
legal norms as they seek to protect their interests. There is still some
(albeit reduced) room for progressive institutional reform in China
under the "rule of law" rubric.
Current developments are not without precedent. Law has never
been far removed from Party politics in China, nor has the judiciary
been independent of Party control. Chinese Party officials supported
legal and court reforms during the 1990s and early 2000s for their
own political purposes. Even at the height of this reform wave, limits
existed as to how far such activity could go. And current struggles in
the Chinese judiciary find historical echoes in swings between profes-
sionalism and populism that have deeply marked both imperial and
modern Chinese history.
Despite these caveats, the shifts in Chinese dispute resolution
practices merit both the attention (and characterization) advanced by
this Article. Legal reforms pursued in the 1980s and 1990s have been
halted or reversed. Chinese legal intellectuals are voicing alarm. Ji-
ang Ping, one of the key drafters of China's post-1978 civil and
administrative codes, has warned that "China's rule of law is in full
retreat."3
Shifts in Chinese dispute resolution do bear similarities with de-
velopments elsewhere. Officials and scholars in many countries are
raising questions regarding the appropriate role of formal law and
court adjudication in dispute resolution. They are searching for effec-
tive alternatives to litigation to respond to (and resolve) citizen
grievances. In many countries, such efforts involve reviving tradi-
tional mediation institutions or founding new ones.
But China's shift against law, this Article argues, is different.
The shift is not being led by lawyers or parties who are opting out of
the court system in search of alternatives to litigation. Nor is it being
3. Jiang Ping, Feb. 21, 2010 speech "China's Rule of Law is in Full Retreat,"
translation available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_1aw-prof-blog/2010/
03/jiang-ping-chinas-rule-of-law-is-in-full-retreat.html. Jiang served as the president
of the China University of Politics and Law in the late 1980s.
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implemented by neutral entities with a degree of independent legiti-
macy, whether traditional village structures or modern neutral
mediators.
Rather, China's turn against law is a top-down authoritarian po-
litical reaction to growing levels of social protest and conflict in the
Chinese system. Chinese leaders face increasing social unrest gener-
ated by civil conflicts between citizens, and between citizens and the
state. Yet Chinese officials remain unwilling to allow the gradual
emergence of independent legal institutions capable of dealing with
such disputes-precisely the reform track pursued by some in the
late twentieth century. Instead, Party authorities are imposing (or
re-imposing) ideological and bureaucratic controls on the court sys-
tem in the name of social stability.
Such efforts are loosely clothed in the language of mediation or
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), but this does not accurately re-
flect their true nature. Their main focus is not on assisting parties to
resolve their grievances (although this may be a beneficial side effect
in some cases). Rather, it is aimed at preventing legal conflicts and
citizen petitions from rising toward central officials. As the top Chi-
nese Party official in charge of political-legal affairs has stated, the
aim of these reforms is to ensure that "small problems do not leave
the village, large problems do not leave the township, [and] conflicts
are not passed up to higher authorities." 4
Shifts in Chinese dispute resolution efforts are not entirely nega-
tive. Excessive emphasis on formal litigation and trials during the
1990s corresponded poorly with the realities of rural Chinese courts.
The new policy line may concentrate official and scholarly attention
on concretely analyzing the mediation practices that actually domi-
nate the workload of these courts. It may produce some practical
changes that respond more effectively to the very real difficulties that
they face. And it may open up some room for useful ADR reforms
throughout the Chinese legal system.
But the official shift away from law carries real risks for China.
Classic normative concerns exist with regard to the effect of these
developments on the rights of parties, the role of the judiciary, and
the legitimacy of legal institutions.5 But another set of concerns ex-
ists as well. Chinese judges are being told to-at all costs-avoid
issuing decisions that might result in citizen protests, petitions, or
complaints to higher authorities. This is undermining legal norms. It
is rendering the judicial system susceptible to a range of populist
pressure as citizens strategically elect to engage in coordinated pro-
4. Zhou Yongkang, Shenru tuijin shehui maodun huajie, [Deeply Push Forward
Resolution of Social Conflict], QIUSHI [SEEKING TRUTH), Feb. 16, 2010, available at
http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2010/201004/201002/t201O0209_20841.htm.
5. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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tests on the internet or in the streets in an effort to sway court
outcomes.
This represents more than a mere shift away from the emphasis
on litigation and trials in the 1990s. Central to the definition of "law"
is an effort to systematically apply rules and standards.6 In a range
of civil and administrative grievances, Chinese officials are backing
away from earlier (albeit tentative) efforts at doing this. Instead, Chi-
nese authorities are increasing their demands that courts abandon
such norms in order to meet political goals of appeasing popular sen-
timent and warding off social protest.
This turn against law is dangerous. It is eroding the very institu-
tions Chinese authorities themselves attempted to construct in the
late twentieth century as a bulwark against social instability.
The Article is divided into three Parts.
Part I examines the substantive shift in the Chinese judiciary. It
tracks the dramatic U-turn in official Chinese dispute resolution ef-
forts over the past three decades. Reliance on Maoist-era mediation
practices gave way to judicial reform efforts in the 1980s and 1990s
that emphasized court adjudication and trials according to formal
law. But since 2003, Chinese Party and court authorities have begun
to resurrect earlier mediation practices, largely as a result of increas-
ing citizen protests and concerns regarding social stability.
Part II of this Article analyzes the political mechanisms by which
Chinese authorities are implementing this shift. It examines the con-
tent of a recent 2010 "model judge" propaganda campaign
surrounding Judge Chen Yanping (quoted at the introduction to this
Article). It compares this with similar campaigns in the late 1990s. It
identifies the new ideal that authorities are seeking to present for
Chinese judges to emulate. These include a heightened responsive-
ness to populist demands and Party policy (rather than legal norms),
a reliance on mediation rather than litigation to resolve problems,
and a commitment to upholding social stability at all costs.
6. See HAN DIAuN [CHARACTER DICTIONARY] (2010) defining fa (law) as "rules of
conduct established and promulgated by the state, embodying the will of the rulers,
which citizens must observe," and with a secondary definition of "standard" or
"model." Emphasis (at least rhetorically) on systematic application of rules, albeit
without the expectation such rules would independently constrain Party power, has
been a hallmark of the reforms launched by Chinese authorities in the wake of the
chaos of the Cultural Revolution. See, e.g., DENG XIAOPING, EMANCIPATE THE MIND,
SEEK TRUTH FROM FACTs AND UNITE AS ONE IN LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 157-58
(1978). See also BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 962 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "law" as "1. The
regime that orders human activities and relations through systematic application of
the force of politically organized society, or through social pressure backed by force, in
such a society. 2. The aggregate of legislation, judicial precedents, and accepted legal
principles; the body of authoritative grounds of judicial and administrative action;
esp., the body of rules, standards, and principles that the courts of a particular juris-
diction apply in deciding controversies brought before them . . .").
9392011]1
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This Part also examines official efforts to shift the concrete finan-
cial and performance incentives facing Chinese judges. Chinese
authorities have reversed course since the late 1990s, when judicial
salary and advancement rewards were strongly based on rates of is-
suing judicial decisions. Since the early 2000s, Chinese judicial
authorities have strengthened the target mediation ratios that judges
and courts are expected to attain. They have also decreased their tol-
erance for judicial decisions that result in disgruntled parties
mounting petitions to higher authorities. Both of these have directly
incentivized Chinese judges to shift away from issuing decisions in
civil and administrative cases.
Part III explores the broader implications of these shifts. It ana-
lyzes the risks facing China as a result of the shift against law. It
argues that official efforts to maintain social stability in the short
term may be having severe long-term effects-undermining Chinese
legal institutions and destabilizing China. It also examines recent
signs that suggest Chinese leaders' turn against law may be ex-
panding into legal education. And it compares China's shift with
developments in other countries, fitting them into a broader litera-
ture regarding "law and society" and "law and development."
Finally, Part III argues for rethinking the trajectory of legal
scholarship on China. Modern research on Chinese law has been
heavily dominated by studies of formal Chinese law and legal institu-
tions. But given Chinese authorities' own shift away from law in civil
and administrative dispute resolution, and in light of the continued
influence of extra-legal institutions and mechanisms, this may not be
warranted. Scholars too, may need to "turn away from law" in their
studies. If they want to understand how the Chinese state operates,
they may need to directly incorporate the study of Party propaganda
and bureaucratic personnel tools in their research.
Methodologically, this Article attempts to illustrate what such a
broader approach might look like. It analyzes the shift in Chinese
dispute resolution practices through an extensive examination of the
full panoply of tools that central officials employ to guide bureau-
cratic institutions such as the judiciary-including formal law,
propaganda materials, internal Party directives, and court evalua-
tion systems. It fuses this textual analysis with first-hand interviews,
public statements by Chinese judges and officials, and research con-
ducted by domestic Chinese academics.
I. 1978-2010: SUBSTANTIVE SHIFTS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In 1978, on the eve of the reform period, Chinese dispute resolu-
tion remained marked by practices that had characterized the
[Vol. 59940
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People's Republic of China since the 1950s.7 These relied on media-
tion led by community activists or officials to resolve civil grievances.
Maoist practices differed from traditional mediation structures pre-
sent in pre-1949 China. They were tightly interwoven with the
official Party apparatus and carried a strong political cast.8 Party
mediators did not just resolve grievances. Rather, they were also ex-
pected to transmit Party doctrine and correct the "feudal thinking" of
parties. Voluntary compromise, though desirable, was not essential.
Mediators could (and often did) bring coercive official or community
pressure to bear on particularly troublesome parties in order to force
them to reach agreement.9 Procedures remained informal; legal
rights were not emphasized.
In the early 1980s, Chinese authorities gradually began to back
away from such practices. Officials advanced court adjudication ac-
cording to formal law as the preferred means of resolving civil
disputes. Legislative reforms enacted in 1982 clarified that mediation
was merely to be "emphasized," rather than "the primary method" for
resolving disputes.10 The 1991 Civil Procedure Law deepened this
shift. It stipulated that court mediation must be voluntary on the
part of parties. It also required courts to issue decisions in the ab-
sence of an agreement between the parties." In the following decade,
Chinese judicial authorities gradually fleshed out and formalized
trial practices through a range of procedural and evidentiary rules.12
Actual implementation of pro-trial reform efforts varied dramati-
cally. Urban court practices changed quickly. But mediation
continued to dominate the workload of Chinese basic-level rural
courts.13
Chinese authorities pursued parallel reforms in the field of ad-
ministrative law. They enacted a raft of laws and regulations,
7. The early years of the PRC witnessed tentative experiments in creating a for-
mal legal system, later abandoned with the onset of more radical Maoist policies in
the late 1950s. Glenn Tiffert, Epistrophy: Chinese Constitutionalism and the 1950s, in
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA (Stephanie Balme & Michael Dowdle eds.,
2009).
8. PHILIP HUANG, CHINESE CIVIL JUSTICE, PAST AND PRESENT 107-08 (2010).
9. STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM AFTER MAo 40-70 (2000).
10. Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The
Limits of Civil Justice Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 38 (Margaret Woo & Mary Gallagher eds., 2011).
11. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minshi susong fa [Civil Procedure Law],(promulgated Apr. 4, 1991, amended Oct. 28, 2007), art. 9, available at http://
www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show.php?file-id=122225.
12. LUBMAN, supra note 9; Fu & Cullen, supra note 10, at 38-43.
13. Even at the height of the pro-trial, pro-decision reforms in 1999, over sixty-
five percent of civil cases in one rural Hebei court were resolved by mediation, rather
than decision. Sida Liu, Beyond Global Convergence: Conflicts of Legitimacy in a Chi-
nese Lower Court, 31 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 75, 96-97 (2006). Note that pressure in
favor of resolving cases through decision shows up even here. The thirty-three percent
of civil cases resolved through decision in 1999 represents a near doubling in compari-
son with the seventeen percent of such cases so resolved, on average, in the 1980s. Id.
20111 941
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including the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), the 2003
Administrative Licensing Law, and the 2007 Regulations on Open
Government, giving citizens limited rights to challenge government
actions in court. The ALL confirmed the preference for litigation, spe-
cifically barring courts from resorting to mediation in administrative
cases.14
Other reforms followed. Educational reforms ensured that law
students primarily studied formal law (rather than Party doctrine)
while at university. This groomed a cadre of judges and officials in-
clined to rely on formal law and court adjudication to resolve citizen
grievances. 15 Reformers even imported (and indigenized) the trap-
pings of Western judicial proceedings to give Chinese judges gravitas
and set them apart from other officials. Chinese judges exchanged
their military uniforms for black judicial robes in 2001, and adopted
the use of the gavel the following year.16
Multiple reasons motivated these changes. First, Party authori-
ties abandoned their revolutionary principles in the post-Mao era.
They retreated from earlier efforts to control all aspects of social and
economic life. This sapped the vigor from Maoist institutions, such as
people's mediation committees, which had relied on a degree of ideo-
logical fervor and official coercion.17 Second, China's rapid economic
development generated an increasing number of civil disputes. Many
involved strangers, migrants, or corporate entities disconnected from
traditional village or state-owned entities. As such, these disputes
were less amenable to resolution by mediation institutions that relied
on existing family or social ties to lead parties toward compromise.' 8
Other factors played a role as well. Relative disinterest of central
Party authorities in dealing with civil disputes created an opening for
the Supreme People's Court (SPC) to occupy the field of civil justice.
Court authorities were able to steer reforms in a technocratic direc-
tion that enhanced their own institutional relevance.' 9 The infusion
of foreign norms emphasizing formal law gave coherence and legiti-
14. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng susong fa [Administrative Litigation
Law], (promulgated Apr. 4, 1989), art. 50, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/
ziliao/2005-02/23/content_2609459.htm.
15. Fu & Cullen, supra note 10, at 30-33.
16. Ethan Michelson, Global Institutions, Indigenous Meaning: Lessons from Chi-
nese Law for the New Institutionalism 32-42 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=876472. The author remembers seeing digital bulletin boards outside basic
level Chinese courts in 2002 with instructions that "the gavel should not be used to
hit the plaintiffs or defendants."
17. Fu & Cullen, supra note 10, at 26-30. Aaron Halegua, Reforming the People's
Mediation System in Urban China, 35 HONG KONG L. J. 715, 718-24 (2005).
18. HUANG, supra note 8, at 129.
19. Fu & Cullen, supra note 10, at 26-30.
[Vol. 59942
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macy to reform efforts. 20 Official Chinese desires to be seen as
adopting international legal standards enhanced receptivity to re-
forms, particularly during the difficult negotiations surrounding
China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.21
Chinese authorities and activists promoted legal reforms to ad-
dress governance problems they saw in China's institutions. The
SPC's first five-year plan for court reform, issued in 1999, identified
corruption and local protectionism as major reasons for deepening
court reform and strengthening reliance on formal legal norms. 2 2
Similarly, top Party authorities supported administrative law re-
forms as a means to enlist citizens in the difficult task of checking
corruption and abuse of power in the lower levels of the Chinese
bureaucracy. 23
Such reforms shifted the workload of Chinese courts. The per-
centage of civil cases resolved via mediation declined steadily from
the early 1980s to the early 2000s, shrinking from around seventy
percent to slightly over thirty percent.24 Following the passage of the
ALL in 1989, administrative suits against the government boomed,
rising from zero to roughly 100,000 in 2001.25
But in recent years, Chinese authorities have shifted tone. They
are turning away from trials and adjudication according to law. Top
Party political-legal authorities are promoting mediation as the key
to resolving all disputes. They have linked it to the Party's new "har-
monious society" political doctrine, enshrined as central policy in
2006.26 Central judicial authorities have reduced their new media-
tion policies to the catchphrase tiaojie youxian, tiaojie shenpanjiehe-"Mediation has priority, and trials should be fused with medi-
ation."27 Mediation experiments have spilled over into criminal and
administrative litigation, the ALL's explicit bar notwithstanding. 2 8
20. HUANG, supra note 8, at 129. Academic exchanges played a key role in facili-
tating transmission of norms. See Randle Edwards, Thirty Years of Legal Exchange
with China: The Columbia Law School Role, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 3 (2009).
21. For an excellent first-hand account of negotiations surrounding the establish-
ment of the U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative under the Clinton administration, see
generally Paul Gewirtz, The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, 11 Wm. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 603 (2003).
22. Renmin fayuan wunian gaige gangyao [Five-Year Reform Plan of the People's
Courts], issued Oct. 20, 1999.
23. Andrew Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, 14 J. OF DEMOCRAcY 6, 14-15
(2003).
24. Fu & Cullen, supra note 10, at 43, figure 1.1.
25. Kevin O'Brien & Li Lianjiang, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litiga-
tion in Rural China, 51 CHINA JOURNAL 75, at 96, table 1 (2004).
26. Zhou, supra note 4.
27. 2010 SPC Work Report [2010 Zui gao renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao], Mar.
18, 2010, available at http://www.gov.cn/20101h/content_1558531.htm.
28. Administrative experiments have taken place via the semantic distinction of
authorizing courts to approve the withdrawal of administrative suits following "recon-
ciliation" [hejie-as contrasted with mediation, or tiaojie] between parties. SPC
Decision on Several Questions Regarding Withdrawal of Suits in Administrative Liti-
2011]1 943
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In their effort to revive court mediation practices, Chinese au-
thorities are drawing on their Maoist heritage for inspiration. As Ben
Liebman has shown, Chinese political-legal authorities are invoking
revolutionary-era models of judging from the 1930s and 1940s for
judges to emulate. These models emphasize a fusion of mediation,
populism, and Party political work as the preferred means to resolve
citizen grievances, instead of trial adjudication according to formal
legal norms. Extreme pressure is being brought on Chinese judges to
do whatever it takes to resolve popular grievances in the name of up-
holding social stability. To that end, informal practices and flexible
norms are again the watchwords of the day.2 9
Official statistics reflect the shift in central preferences. Admin-
istrative litigation caseloads of Chinese courts reached a plateau in
1998, remaining little changed over the following decade.3 o With re-
gard to civil litigation, Chinese authorities are reporting figures
that-at least on the surface-reflect massive increases in mediation.
According to the SPC work reports, the percentage of civil cases re-
solved through mediation in China doubled from thirty-one percent
in 2004, to sixty-two percent in 2009. If true, this would represent an
astounding tripling (from 1.33 million to 3.59 million) of the total
number of cases closed through mediation in just five years!31 Closer
examination reveals that the SPC is fudging the numbers in an ap-
parent effort to inflate their totals, changing their reporting (starting
in 2007) to include cases withdrawn by parties as well as those suc-
cessfully mediated. 32 But both numerical manipulation by the SPC,
gation Proceedings [Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu xingzheng susong chesu ruogan
wenti de guiding], art 4, issued Dec. 17, 2007, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/
flwk/show.php?fileid=124166. For a discussion of recent criminal mediation and rec-
onciliation efforts, see XINGSHI HEJIE: SHIZHENG YANJIU [EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON
CRIMINAL MEDIATION (sic)] (Song Yinghui ed., 2010).
29. See Ben Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality: Historical Legacies and Legal
Reform, in MAO'S INVISIBLE HAND (Sebastian Heilman & Elizabeth J. Perry eds.,
2010).
30. He Haibo, Xingzheng susong chesu kao (1987-2008) [An Examination of With-
drawal of Administrative Litigation Cases (1987-2008)], available at http://
law.china.cn/features/2009-12/31/content3325153.htm. But see the 2010 SPC Work
Report (containing the relevant statistics for 2009), indicating a twenty percent in-
crease in first-instance administrative cases by comparison with 2007, Zui gao renmin
fayuan 2010 nian gongzuo baogao [2009 SPC Work Report], issued 2010 (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/yw/201003/t20100319_3244.htm.
31. Compare Zui gao renmin fayuan 2005 nian gongzuo baogao [2005 SPC Work
Report], available at http://www.court.gov.cn/work/200503180013.htm (containing
the relevant statistics for 2004), with Zui gao renmin fayuan 2010 nian gongzuo bao-
gao [2009 SPC Work Report], available at http://www.court.gov.cn/xwzx/yw/201003/
t20100319_3244.htm (containing the corresponding statistics for 2009).
32. Compare Zui gao renmin fayuan 2007 nian gongzuo baogao [2007 SPC Work
Report], available at http://www.court.gov.cn/work/200503180013.htm (noting that
30.41% percent of civil cases were resolved through mediation, while 55.06% of first-
instance civil cases were resolved through "mediation and withdrawal of the case"),
with Zui gao renmin fayuan 2008 nian gongzuo baogao [2008 SPC Work Report],
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com /newscenter/2008-03/22/content_7837838.htm
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and parallel reporting by lower courts of suspiciously high mediation
rates, give some idea of the practical pressures Chinese courts are
facing.33
Official emphasis on mediation takes several different forms.
The first is promotion of extra-judicial mediation. Since 2002, Chi-
nese authorities have attempted to resuscitate people's mediation
committees administered by local villagers and residents committees.
A cornerstone of Maoist-era dispute resolution practices, these insti-
tutions had fallen into disrepair in the wake of the legal reforms of
the 1980s and 1990s. In recent years, national authorities have at-
tempted to reverse this trend, increasing the resources available to
these committees and strengthening the binding nature of mediated
agreements reached under their auspices. 34
The 2010 Law on People's Mediation builds on these efforts, codi-
fying earlier pro-mediation measures in national law. It provides that
courts may instruct litigants to seek mediation by people's mediation
committees.35 It also creates procedures for courts to ratify agree-
ments reached via such mediation (following application by both
parties within thirty days of the effective date of the agreement, and
after court examination of the content). Once ratified, any subse-
quent violation of the agreement by one party allows the other side to
initiate immediate enforcement proceedings.36
Second, Chinese authorities are also aggressively pushing medi-
ation within the judiciary. In 2007, the SPC issued a judicial opinion
pressing lower courts and judges to employ mediation as the pre-
ferred avenue for resolving cases before them.37 Depictions vary as to
what such judicial mediation involves in practice. Official propa-
ganda portrays model judges, imbued with an unwavering desire to
serve the masses, patiently visiting aggrieved individuals in their
homes, day after day, listening to their heartfelt complaints, gradu-
ally leading them down the path of reconciliation, and restoring
(noting merely that 50.74% of civil cases were resolved by "mediation and withdrawal
of the case").
33. See, e.g., Ma Teng, Suide fayuan minshi anjian tiaojie lu da dao 95.7 [Civil
Mediation Rates for Suide Court Reach 95.7%], Suide Government Website, May 23,
2010, available at http://www.sdhan.com/sdh/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticlelD=
4709.
34. Halegua, supra note 17, at 722-29.
35. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tiaojie fa [Law on People's Mediation] (promul-
gated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 28, 2010, effective Jan. 1,
2011), art. 18, available at http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2010-08/30/
content 20819825.htm.
36. Id., arts. 32-33.
37. Supreme People's Court Opinion on Further Increasing the Positive Role of
Mediation (in Litigation) in Constructing Socialism and a Harmonious Society [Zui
gao renmin fayuan guanyu jin yi bu fahui susong tiaojie zai goujian shehui zhuyi
hexie shehui zhong jiji zuoyong de ruogan yijian], issued Mar. 7, 2007, available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/showl.php?file-id=116688.
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social harmony.38 One Chinese public interest lawyer offers a differ-
ent picture:
It depends whether you are in front of one of the "slippery
old judges" or one of the younger ones. The older judges will
work the parties over. They will tell the villagers [plaintiffs
in an environmental suit]: "It might be a good idea to accept
the settlement offer in front of you-it is not certain that my
decision regarding compensation will be as favorable." Then
they will go over to the defendant [corporation] and say:
"You should compromise-you wouldn't want your image to
suffer if I publicly issue an adverse judicial decision." Doing
this requires a degree of social skills and an ability to push
people. Younger judges just don't have that. Their tendency
is to simply try to resolve things by the book.39
Yet a third form of state-sponsored mediation exists as well.
Since 2004, Chinese political-legal authorities have promoted Party-
led "big mediation" (da tiaojie) practices to handle complex disputes
that may generate mass citizen discontent or social unrest. Examples
include land seizures, corporate reorganizations of failed enterprises,
and collective grievances against local officials. 40
As the transcript of one such "big mediation" proceeding reveals,
they are primarily political conferences aimed at coordinating re-
sponses between government bureaus (including the judiciary) and
crafting solutions to ward off protest.4 ' Discussions can be conducted
with limited reference to legal norms, outside of legal channels (in-
cluding before cases are filed, or after judicial decisions are issued),
and without the actual participation of the nominal parties. Horse-
trading between officials takes place. Political pressure is brought to
bear on recalcitrant bureaus to compromise.
In such high-pressure cases, judges are but one party out of
many at the political bargaining table. Often with their own career
evaluations at stake (discussed below), the role of judges is far re-
moved from that of a disinterested neutral. In some cases, they may
serve as legal advisors, offering proposals that (if accepted) might
generally keep the ultimate solution within the rough bounds of le-
gality. In others, mediation can devolve into what Hualing Fu has
38. See infra notes 54-76, and text.
39. Interview, Beijing, July 13, 2010. For further discussion of judicial mediation,
see Vicki Waye & Ping Xiong, The Relationship Between Mediation and Judicial Pro-
ceedings in China, 6 AsLAw J. oF Comp. LAw 1, 19-24 (2011).
40. Ai Jiahui, Weiwen luoji xia de "da tiaojie"ji qi kunjing ["Big Mediation" Under
the Logic of Social Stabilization and Its Problems] (draft on file with author), 1-2.
41. Id.
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termed "an exercise of state power by local bureaucrats under the
guise of tradition."42
What explains the shift in central attitudes away from law,
courts, and adjudication in recent years? Scholars broadly agree on a
common narrative. While central Chinese leaders had heavily em-
phasized formal law as a tool to handle civil and administrative
grievances, late twentieth century court reforms failed to create effec-
tive institutions for resolving citizen grievances. The failure to
deepen institutional reform meant that courts remained weak actors
vis a vis entrenched local Party, government, and commercial inter-
ests. At the same time, China experienced a growing number of
economic and social disputes resulting from rapid development. This
resulted in a pervasive inability to enforce court verdicts, increasing
numbers of extra-legal petitions and protests to higher Chinese au-
thorities, and violent confrontations between courts and disgruntled
citizens.43
Fear of mounting social unrest led central Chinese authorities to
rethink reform policies. Officials viewed domestic Chinese develop-
ments against the backdrop of the 2003-2005 "color revolutions" that
ousted authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Starting around 2003, civil dispute resolution moved from the mar-
gins to become a central Party concern. Some reform projects were
criticized for importing formal law and legal institutions that meshed
poorly with practical realities in China's rural areas. Others were
faulted for leading Chinese courts and officials away from their popu-
list roots, creating artificial barriers between the people and officials
that weakened support for the Party.44 Party authorities also warned
that some judges had used concepts such as "the supremacy of the
law" or "deciding cases according to law" as excuses to avoid or oppose
Party leadership in judging cases, particularly under the corrosive
influence of Western legal concepts. 45
Chinese authorities began to emphasize mediation in response to
social stability concerns. Central authorities assert that this is neces-
42. Hualing Fu, The Politics of Mediation in a Chinese County: The Case of Luo
Lianxi, 5 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW 107, 122 (2003).
43. See generally Fu & Cullen, supra note 10; Liebman, supra note 29, Randall
Peerenboom, More Law, Less Courts: Legalized Governance Judicialization and
Dejudicialization in China (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1265147. Chinese officials agree with this narrative. See the
comments of the Yichang Intermediate People's Court President (and Party secretary)
Hu Xingru, Tan goujian sifa hexie ying shuli de jiben guannian [Discussion on the
Basic Notions Necessary to be Established in Order to Construct of Judicial Har-
mony], Apr. 11, 2008, available at http://www.hicourt.gov.cn/theory/artilce-list.asp?
id=5281&1_class=2.
44. Id. Authorities remembered lessons from their own history. Pre-1949 Party
cadres were adept at exploiting similar divisions to mobilize popular discontent
against the Nationalist regime.
45. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 43.
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sary to resolve increasing numbers of extra-judicial citizen petitions
and protests.46 Indeed, when SPC officials ordered lower courts to in-
crease their use of mediation in 2007, they singled out several types
of cases for which closed-door mediation was particularly en-
couraged-including those "involving large numbers of people" and
those "that are very sensitive, receiving significant social
attention."47
At the same time, authorities also took steps to rein in politically
wayward courts and judges. In 2006, Party authorities launched a
"socialist rule of law theory" campaign in courts and other legal insti-
tutions. This campaign stressed loyalty to the Communist Party and
the need to avoid the pernicious influence of "Western" rule-of-law
theories.48 In 2008, central authorities named a former provincial
public security chief as the new SPC head. He replaced the outgoing
president, closely identified with earlier judicial reform and rule-of-
law efforts. Within months, Chinese courts were enmeshed in the
"Three Supremes" campaign, which emphasized Party doctrine and
populist sentiment as equal (if not superior) to the constitution and
law as sources for guiding judicial work.49 In the following months,
Chinese authorities reasserted Party control over the bar, and
stepped up harassment of public interest activists and lawyers who
had taken advantage of court and administrative law reforms to
launch an increasingly well-organized series of legal challenges
against local and central government policies.50
46. Zhou, supra note 4.
47. SPC Opinion on Further Increasing the Positive Role of Mediation, supra note
37, art 5.
48. Luo Gan Qiushi fa wenzhang: Jiaqiang shehuizhuyi fazhi linian jiaoyu [Luo
Gan Publishes Article In 'Seeking Truth': Strengthen Socialist-Rule-of-Law Educa-
tion], YNHUA, June 15, 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-06/
15/content_4703143.htm.
49. Carl Minzner, Riots and Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control of Local
Agents in China, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L LAw 53, 117-18 (2009).
50. In April 2009, the Ministry of Justice and national bar association launched a
political campaign emphasizing Party leadership and calling on Chinese lawyers to
"consciously resist the plots of Western enemy forces to infiltrate the thinking of law-
yers." Guanyu zai hishi duiwu zhong kaizhan "Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi fali
gongzuozhe" huodong de yijian [Opinion on Launching the "Socialist Legal Workers
With Chinese Characteristics" Campaign Among the Ranks of Lawyers], Ministry of
Justice Website, Apr. 24, 2009, at http://www.moj.gov.cn/2008zwgg/2009-04/24/con-
tent_1082558.htm. In the spring and summer of 2009, Chinese authorities raided a
number of activist law firms handling sensitive cases that had gathered national at-
tention, and cancelled or refused to reissue licenses for dozens of lawyers, including
several high-profile public interest activists. Donald Clarke, Lawyers and the State in
China: Recent Developments, Testimony Before the Congressional-Executive Com-
mission on China, Oct. 7, 2009, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/2009/
20091007/dclarkelOO709.pdf. Harassment and detentions of legal activists and law-
yers increased yet further in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring.
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II. IMPLEMENTING THE TURN AGAINST LAW
Chinese authorities are using multiple tools to implement the
shift away from court adjudication and legal norms. Some of these
tools are legal in nature, such as the 2010 Law on People's Mediation
discussed above.51 But authorities are also using political tools to
reshape the Chinese judiciary. These include "model judge" propa-
ganda campaigns and target responsibility systems.
Neither of these mechanisms is new. Both are deeply rooted in
prior Party and imperial governance practices. Model judge cam-
paigns are the modern incarnations of 1950s-era Communist "model
worker" and imperial Chinese "model official" efforts. 52 Contempo-
rary target responsibility systems are the lineal descendants of
earlier Party and imperial bureaucratic management practices.53
A. "Model Judge" Propaganda Campaigns Compared: 2010 and
1999
Chinese authorities regularly use ideological campaigns to press
lower-level officials and bureaus to implement particular policy lines.
These campaigns blend propaganda, official speeches, and small-
group study sessions. They often focus on exalting a "model official"
(or in the judiciary, a "model judge") who inculcates specific policies
or values that central authorities seek to promote. Comparing two
model judge campaigns, in 2010 and in 1999, illustrates the shift in
official Chinese dispute resolution policies. 54
The Chen Yanping campaign is a good example of a recent, na-
tionwide model judge campaign. Unfolding over the first half of 2010,
it was no small affair. On January 19th, top Party and judicial offi-
cials gathered in Beijing to commemorate the accomplishments of
Judge Chen, a district court judge from Jiangsu province.5 5 Extensive
51. Law on People's Mediation, supra note 35.
52. See, e.g., Patricia Stranahan, Labor Heroines of Yan'an, 9 MODERN CHINA 288
(1983).
53. Minzner, supra note 49, at 61-66; MICHAEL DuTTON, POLICING CHINESE POLIT-
ics 258-300 (2005); JEAN C. Oi, STATE AND PEASANT IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VILLAGE GOVERNMENT (1989).
54. Aside from its recent, large-scale nature, the 2010 Chen Yanping campaign
was chosen because extensive reporting on the campaign is available online, including
a dedicated section on the main website of the Chinese judiciary with a full archive of
state media reports, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/zhuanti/subject.php?sjt-
id=454. The 1999 model female judge campaign was chosen for its roughly similar
nature: a nationwide campaign, including a formal appearance with the head of the
Politburo member in charge of political-legal affairs. The fact that Chen and the ten
judges in the 1999 campaign are all female helps control for differences in gender
depictions. Last, sufficient state media articles on the judges in the 1999 campaign
permit comparisons with the 2010 one.
55. For the official praise of Judge Chen by the SPC head, see Luo Shuqin & Chen
Yonghui, Wang Shengiun: Yi Chen Yanping tongzhi wei bangyang zuo renmin xinfu
de hao faguan [Wang Shengiun: Take Comrade Chen Yanping as a Model, Be Good
9492011]
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propaganda followed in subsequent months. State media effusively
praised her, detailed her exploits, and provided an official hagiogra-
phy of her life. (A translated sample of two shorter articles is
reproduced in the appendix.) From January to June 2010, the home
webpage of the Chinese judiciary carried a banner headline extolling
Judge Chen. In March, the SPC president singled her out for praise
in his annual work report to the national legislature (a session for
which Judge Chen was also selected as a legislative delegate). Local
courts throughout China mobilized their judges to attend internal
study sessions to learn from Judge Chen's example.56
Suppose you are an astute, ambitious young Chinese judge sit-
ting in one such study session. You seek to decode the messages
contained in the official propaganda. Jaded by similar campaigns in
the past, you may not actually believe the official depiction of Judge
Chen. But your political antenna is attuned to shifts in content and
nuance. After all, these are guides to changes in official expectations
that may have implications regarding how to best advance your ca-
reer. What do you learn?
Well, Judge Chen is clearly a paragon of judicial perfection for
you to emulate. You read in official reports that she has handled over
3100 cases in fourteen years; without a single complaint or appeal;
without a single petition by a disgruntled party; without even one
wrongly decided case. Her decisions are uniformly accepted by all
parties.57 You read that her correct work ethic, merged with her ear-
nest desire to realize the Confucian ideal of "a world without
litigation" (tianxia wusong),5 8 helps her achieve the Party's goal of a
"harmonious society" (hexie shehui).5 9
Judges That People Trust], China Court Bulletin, Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://
epc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/10814789.html.
56. Jiangsu gaoji renmin fayuan gongzuo baogao [Jiangsu Province High People's
Court Work Report], Jiangsu Court Web, Feb. 10, 2010, available at http:l
www.jsfy.gov.cn/ztlm/qglhllhxw/2010/02/505436908421543.html.
57. He Chunzhong, Yi wei shengbai jiefu de nongcunjiceng faguan [A Rural Basic
Level People's Judge Whose Decisions Are Accepted By Victors and Losers Alike],
CHINA YouTH DAILY, Jan. 18, 2010, available at http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2010-01/
18/content_3043751.htm; Tan Yulian, Chen Yanping faguan zai yici rang wi gandong
[Judge Chen Yanping Has Moved Me Again], Aug. 27, 2010, China Court Net, availa-
ble at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=425362.
58. Id. This is an indirect reference to Confucius, Analects 12, "In hearing litiga-
tion, I am as good as any other. What is necessary, however, is to cause the people to
have no litigation."
59. Judge Chen's own comments cast doubt on the wildly exuberant claims of offi-
cial propaganda. As she herself noted in an interview, "'A world without litigation,'
this is my New Year's wish every year. Of course, this can't be achieved. Not only can
it not be achieved, in today's transitional society, conflicts can only increase. Take my
own court, for example. Our caseload has increased 30% in the last three years . . ."
Gu Weizhong, "Neng dong sifa" de hexie shizhe [A Harmony-Maker Who Can 'Move the
Judiciary], XJNHUA DAILY, Dec. 29, 2009, available at http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/
xinwen_zhong.xin/2009-12/29/content_18622749.htm.
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You clearly sense the newfound official preference for media-
tion,60 and you perceive some disdain for formal legal norms. Judge
Chen's successes are ascribed to her avoidance of law and her unflag-
ging effort to mediate all cases that come before her.61 Unlike "some
judges" who consider mediation too time-consuming or difficult,
Judge Chen is willing to spend hours, days, or weeks to reach a medi-
ated conclusion. While such work may not demonstrate or require
"any consummate trial skills or [any] deep grounding in basic legal
skills," and will not result in fame or attention as the result of a me-
dia-worthy decision, it receives the "true love and admiration of the
masses."62 Direct instructions grab your attention. "Judges should
not be legal craftsmen who pay excessive attention to wording, be-
lieve the laws of statutes to be the only scripture, and pay no
attention to social harmony and the popular interest."*6
Popular interest? Ah, you see. This is an effort to return the Chi-
nese judiciary to its Party-led, populist roots. Your court president
(also the court Party secretary) is lecturing you that Judge Chen's
style of work is the spiritual successor to 1940s and 1950s "mass line"
practices aimed at maintaining tight links between Party officials
and the people.64 Sure, you are expected to firmly adhere to Party
doctrine.65 But you are also expected to maintain "true sentiment,"
"true love," and "a true heart" for the people, "draw close to the
masses, walk among the masses ... and feel the people's concerns as
[your] own."6 6 YOU should not be like those other judges who merely
60. Huang Xiuli, Tiaojie tiaojie zai tiaojie: Sifa tiaojie youxian huajie shehui
maodun [Mediate, Mediate, and Then Mediate Again: The Principle of Judicial Medi-
ation Above All Else Resolves Social Conflict], Southern Weekend, Mar. 4, 2010,
available at http://nf.nfdaily.cn/nfzm/content/2010-03/04/content9744376.htm.
61. "The reason why Judge Chen's mediation succeeds is that she relies not on
law, but on morality and human sentiment." Chen Yanping: Ai tiaojie, shao panjue de
jiceng faguan, yi 'de' fu ren [Chen Yanping: A District Court Judge Who Favors Media-
tion, Issues Judicial Decisions in Few Cases, Uses Morality to Convince People],
BEIJING NEWS, Jan. 18, 2010, available at http://comment.bjnews.com.cn/2010/0118/
18046.shtml.
62. Xie Ying, A Judge for the Average Person, [Pingmin faguan], China Court Net,
Mar. 3, 2010, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/201003/03/397566.
shtml.
63. Wang Zichen, Junzi bu qi: Chen Yanping de sifa zhihui, [An Exemplary Per-
son Should Not Become a Vessel: The Judicial Wisdom of Chen Yanping], People's
Court Bulletin, Feb. 9, 2010, p. 2, available at http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/paper/page/
1/2010-02/09/02/2010020902_pdf.pdf.
64. See comments by the Jiangsu High People's Court president and Party secre-
tary, Gong Pixiang: Chen Yanping gongzuo fa shi xin yidai Ma Xiwu shenpan fangshi,
[Gong Pixiang: The Chen Yanping Work Style is the Ma Xiwu System ofAdjudication
for a New Era], LEGAL DAILY, Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.
cn/bm/content/2010-02/24/content_2063569.htm?node=20731.
65. Zhao Xunqing, Faguan de zeren [Judge's Responsibilities], Beijing Court Net,
Feb. 23, 2010, available at http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=83258.
66. Wang Mingzhao, Chen Yanping jingshen shi dangdai faguan de zhiyin [The
Spirit of Chen Yanping is the Guide for Today's Judges], China Court Net, Jan. 22,
2010, at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/201001/22/392473.shtml.
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rely on "cold" law and "mechanical procedures" to handle cases,67 sep-
arating themselves from the people.
You see that Western legal norms are explicitly rejected. Cam-
paign materials instruct that "simply adopting Western concepts of
rule of law," or "fantasizing about 'transplants' or 'integrating [with
the rest of the world]' as a means to replicate foreign legal systems-
this is to confuse tangerines for oranges."68 Western judges are criti-
cized for "living in seclusion," for "separating themselves from
society," and for "divorcing themselves from reality."69 In contrast,
China's "socialist judicial road" and national character (guoqing) de-
mands adherence to revolutionary practices and populist spirit.70
But you notice something else as well. Campaign materials do
not limit themselves to Communist rhetoric. Rather, they also claim
that Judge Chen embodies classical Chinese values as well. They
praise her work as being "deeply nurtured by Confucianism." They
describe her belief that a judge must rule through virtue and moral
suasion.7' Her work is said to incarnate the Confucian concept of be-
nevolence (ren).7 2 She is hailed as the "perfect embodiment" of the
Confucian moral exemplar of a junzi (gentleman, exemplary per-
son).73 (Odd. Didn't your parents tell you that they had participated
in a Maoist political campaign during the 1970s explicitly aimed at
wiping out Confucian influence?) 74 Passages from the Confucian clas-
sics are explicitly reinterpreted for campaign purposes. The SPC
bulletin eulogizes Judge Chen for adhering to the concept of 'junzi bu
qi." As Chinese philosophers note, the original phrase indicates that
an exemplary person (or gentleman) should not be a mere specialist,
but rather a comprehensive vessel, capable of being used for many
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Pan Shichang, Ta yong da'ai shixian falii de zunyan, [She Uses Great Love to
Realize the Dignity of the Law], Xuexi xuanchuan Chen Yanping tongzhi xianjin shiji
zuotanhui fayan zhaiyao, [Summary of the Speeches at the [Taizhou Government]
Symposium on Studying and Propagating the Advanced Deeds of Comrade Chen
Yanping], Dec. 15, 2010, Taizhou Municipal Government website, available at http://
www.taizhou.gov.cn/art/2009/12/15/art_18_48626.html.
70. Id.
71. The campaign downplays specialized knowledge. Chen herself is quoted as
saying "in order to serve as a judge, just like serving as a doctor, one must first estab-
lish one's moral principles and have a compassionate heart." Zhang Liang, Bu ju
qingli fali wennuan ru si [Not Excluding The Accepted Codes of Human Conduct: The
Warmth of the Law], Jan. 20, 2010, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/con-
tent/2010-01/20/content 2030784.htm?node=20729.
72. Li Xiaomei, Chen Yanping gongzuo fa de lishi chuancheng yu xianshi gongx-
ian [The Historical Heritage and Practical Significance of Chen Yanping's Style of
Work], China Court Net, Feb. 11, 2010, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/html/
article/201002/11/395312.shtml.
73. Wang, supra note 63.
74. See A. James Gregor & Maria Hsia Chang, Anti-Confucianism: Mao's Last
Campaign, 19 AsLAw SuRvEY 1073 (1979).
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purposes.7 5 The SPC bulletin, however, provides its own gloss on the
phrase:
From the perspective of the judiciary, this phrase can be un-
derstood as saying that a judge with good moral conduct
cannot simply be a tool that mechanistically applies the law
in the process of handling cases. Rather, a judge must grasp
social conditions, be well-versed in all forms of judicial skills,
be good at resolving disputes, and amply bring into play the
utility of the judiciary as a good defender of the social
order.76
The 2010 campaign's portrayal of Judge Chen is particularly
striking when compared with propaganda depictions of model Chi-
nese judges in the late 1990s.
Similarities do exist. As with Judge Chen, late 1990s model
judges were shining examples of hard work, even at the expense of
their own health.77 Their annual case closure rates were double or
triple of that of other judges.78 And they were almost never wrong in
their decisions. Out of the ten judges selected as "National Outstand-
ing Female Judges" in 1999, six were reported as never having a
single case reversed on appeal or sent back for retrial.79
State media depictions of late 1990s model judges also somewhat
paralleled the current ones of Judge Chen. Judges stood firmly on the
side of the Communist Party. They were praised as good Party mem-
bers.80 They firmly supported key Party-state objectives. One
published an article in the national Party theoretical journal publicly
praising official efforts to wipe out the Falun Gong spiritual move-
ment.81 And judges received praise for their out-of-court efforts to
75. Wu Ning, Peking University, Becoming a Vessel or Not, paper presented at
the Third BESETO Conference of Philosophy, Jan. 10-11, 2009, available at http://
utcp.c.u-tokyo.acjp/events/pdfl023_WuNing_3rdBESETO.pdf.
76. Wang, supra note 63.
77. See, e.g., the description of Judge Yue Lu, in Kua shiji de xianfeng zhanshi
[Vanguard Warriors for the New Century], 7 GONGCHANDANGYUAN [COMMUNIST PARTY
MEMBER] at 12 (1999) (continuing to work while receiving extensive treatments for
cancer).
78. See, e.g., the description of Judge Zhao Xiaoli, in Shensheng de zhuiqiu [Sa-
cred Pursuit], 9 DANGJIAN [PARTY CONSTRUCTION], at 23-24 (1997).
79. Quanguo shi jiechu nii faguan shiji jianjie [A Brief Introduction to the Accom-
plishments of Ten National Outstanding Female Judges], GUANGMING DAILY, Feb. 26,
1999, (hereafter A Brief Introduction) available at http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/1999-
02/26/GB/17979%5EGM3-2609.htm.
80. See, e.g., Vanguard Warriors for the New Century, supra note 77.
81. Shang Xiuyun, Jianchi yifa zhiguo, qudi feifa zuzhi [Firmly Support Rule of
Law, Suppress Illegal Organizations], 16 QIUSHI [SEEKING TRUTH] 15-16 (1999).
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resolve disputes, and their unflagging commitment to serving the
people. 82
But key differences exist as well. There was no overwhelming
emphasis on miraculous successes with mediation. When late 1990s
model judges were extolled for resolving large numbers of cases, they
were praised for doing so via shenjie (resolving cases through trial),
rather than through mediation (tiaojie).83 Sure, passing mention was
made of high mediation ratios achieved by particular judges. But
there was no politicized narrative presenting mediation as a miracle
cure for all instances of social discontent. And there was no effort to
explicitly invoke Confucian norms to legitimate judging styles of late
1990s model judges.
In fact, the official depiction of several late 1990s model judges
was diametrically opposed to that of Judge Chen. Take Judge Qin
Lingmei. Her nickname in the state media? The "Stone-Cold [Faced]
Judge."84 This referred to her reputation for "cool-headedness," "ra-
tionality," "adherence to neutrality," and "rejection of excessive social
contacts." Her impassiveness and lack of contact toward parties were
particularly highlighted. She maintained that, although nearsighted,
she often did not wear glasses while working. When parties at-
tempted to find her after a court hearing, she was able to pretend
that she "didn't recognize" them, enabling her to escape difficult in-
terpersonal relationships.85 Judge Zhu Xiaomei is another example.
State media praised her as the judge who "distrusted the county
Party committee," for challenging a county Party secretary's decision
regarding a pending criminal case, eventually reversing it.86
Judge Gao Binghuan provides yet another contrast with Judge
Chen. Judge Gao was eulogized for her fearless efforts in executing
court judgments. After a factory boss refused to comply with a court
order in commercial litigation proceedings, Judge Gao made an ini-
tial visit to attempt to reason with him. When that failed, she arrived
at the factory gates with a team of judicial personnel to order his ar-
rest. As they advanced to handcuff the factory head, he shouted for
assistance from the surrounding mob of 200 factory workers (and his
supporters). A large-scale riot ensued. Judges were attacked, vehicles
destroyed. Judge Gao herself was beaten senseless and passed out.
82. Ji Yanan, Tianping zhong yu shan [Heavenly Peace is Weightier than a Moun-
tain], GUANGMING DAILY, Feb. 10, 1999, available at gmw.cn/01gmrb/1999-02/10/GB/
17964%5EGM1-1016.htm.
83. 'Tie faguan' Tan Yan "Iron Judge" Tan Yan], XINHUA, Sept. 9, 1999, available
at http://gmw.cn/Olgmrb/1999-09/09/GB/gm%5E18174%5E3%5EGM3-0908.htm.
84. A Brief Introduction, supra note 79.
85. Fang Ning, Yu rennao zhi wai [Outside the Hubbub (of Life)], SHANGHAI RENDA
YUEKAN [SHANGHAI PEOPLE'S CONGRESS MONTHLY], 2003.
86. Ni Siyi, Quanguo shi dajiechu nit faguan shou biaozhang, [Ten National Out-
standing Female Judges are Recognized], XINHUA, available at http://web.peopledaily.
com.cn/haiwai/199902/26/newfiles/B111.html.
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After being held hostage for twelve hours, she was rescued and sent
to the hospital with a concussion. Following due attention to the case
from the Beijing High People's Court and the prefectural Party com-
mittee, the factory head received a prison sentence for interfering
with the execution of judicial verdicts. And Judge Gao? "She said it
well: '[w]e must uphold the authority of the law, even at the cost of
our lives.'"87
Such propaganda from prior decades is strikingly discordant
with the current official line regarding Judge Chen. The 1990s model
judges mentioned above were not warm and fuzzy. They did not mi-
raculously achieve social harmony. Judge Gao's actions actually
triggered an anti-government riot. Judges in the late 1990s were ex-
alted for adhering to a somewhat autonomous concept of law. They
were depicted as enforcing legal norms in civil disputes, even at the
cost of social discontent, and in criminal (or administrative) disputes,
even at the cost of conflict with core local Party leaders.
The contrast shows how Chinese propaganda narrative regard-
ing judges (and law) has shifted in the last ten years. The campaign
surrounding Judge Chen is part of an effort to reinterpret the role of
judges: towards populist, Party-led mediation and away from adjudi-
cation according to law.
B. Target Responsibility Systems: Money for Mediation
Official Chinese efforts to alter judicial behavior and increase the
use of mediation are not limited to propaganda portrayals of exem-
plary officials. Rather, they are also shifting the concrete
performance incentives for judges.
One Chinese district court clearly explains this in an article enti-
tled "How to Raise Mediation Rates":
In the 2009 campaign, the Yancheng (district) court paid
great attention to mediation work. It made civil mediation a
component of (court) target responsibility systems, thereby
altering the views of court personnel with regard to trials ...
In the past, we highly emphasized judicial rates of issuing
verdicts in the courtroom [as a component of evaluating judi-
cial work performance]. This led to high rates of cases
decided by verdict. It also led to conflictual relationships be-
tween parties, difficulty enforcing verdicts, and was not
beneficial for the purposes of finally and completely resolv-
ing problems (anjie shiliao).
87. Li Enshi, Ni faguan Gao Binghuan [Female Judge Gao Binghuan], 17 LABOR
UNION READER (2001). Note that Judge Gao is also quoted as saying that it is essen-
tial for judges to rely on li (reason) rather than qing (sentiment, feelings) in their
work. Exactly the opposite claim is made for Judge Chen Yanping. See Zhang, supra
note 71.
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In accordance with changing times, this court has strength-
ened the use of mediation. We have made mediation rates
"hard targets" in annual target responsibility systems used
for evaluating judicial performance. We have made financial
awards to judges for mediating cases higher than those
awarded for deciding cases.. .. We have insisted that every
case be mediated, and paid much attention to the Uudicial]
rates of successful mediation. These policies have led to
large increases in mediation rates for this court-15%
higher compared with last year. Mediation has become a
bright spot in the work of the Yancheng district court.88
Such methods are not unusual. In 2007, the SPC specifically
called for courts to implement such policies in order to press judges to
actively pursue mediation.8 9 These calls have since echoed through
the Chinese judicial bureaucracy.90
What are the target responsibility systems that the Yanping
court refers to? These are systems widely employed by Chinese au-
thorities to evaluate, discipline, and reward Party and government
officials (including judges). They link officials' careers and salaries to
success in attaining designated performance targets, frequently nu-
merical in nature. Local Party secretaries, for example, face annual
targets for economic development, tax collection, birth control, pov-
erty alleviation, Party building, and social order. Judges also face
targets. These include mediation, case closure, and appellate reversal
ratios.91 Officials who succeed in meeting their targets receive salary
and career rewards, such as enhanced chances for promotion. Those
who fail (or perform lower than others) are correspondingly sanc-
tioned.92 Targets differ in importance. Exceptionally important
targets-such as social order, birth control, or (in the Yancheng
court) mediation-may be designated as "hard" targets or "priority
targets with veto power." Failure to attain these can unilaterally can-
cel out positive performance in other fields. This makes officials
88. Xu Fengmei, Ruhe rutigao tiaojie lii, [How to Raise Mediation Rates], Nov. 3,
2009, website of the Yancheng District People's Court of Tahe Municipality, available
at http://1hycfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=107.
89. See, e.g., Supreme People's Court Opinion on Further Increasing the Positive
Role of Mediation, supra note 37, art. 21.
90. For the comments of the vice-president of a Shandong intermediate court, see
Meng Wei, Nuli kaichuang susong tiaojie gongzuo xin jumian [Strongly Realize a New
Face of Judicial Mediation Work], China Court website, Jan. 15, 2007, available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200701/15/230610.shtml.
91. Minzner, supra note 49, at 67-74.
92. Id.; Maria Edin, State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre
Management from a Township Perspective, 173 CHINA Q. 35, 38-40 (2003); Susan H.
Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party Rule,
in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER 101, 112-15 (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds.,
2004).
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particularly attentive to meeting (or at least appearing to meet) such
targets. 93
Target responsibility systems play a crucial role in Chinese gov-
ernance. As this author has detailed in earlier work, they are a key
mechanism for higher authorities to steer the lower bureaucracy.94
Setting (or altering) specific targets incentivizes lower-level officials
to engage in (or change) particular behavior.
Beginning in the 1990s, Chinese authorities started to decrease
the importance of mediation ratios (prominently emphasized during
the 1980s) in performance evaluations of judges. In contrast, they
strengthened the weight given to judicial decisions.95 Court officials
set higher targets for the numbers of cases to be resolved via judicial
decision.96 This (unsurprisingly) led to both decreases in the numbers
of cases reported to be resolved via mediation, and increases in the
numbers of judicial decisions issued.97
Exactly the same process-but in reverse-has been playing it-
self out in recent years. Starting around 2003, courts across China
began to increase the importance of mediation in judicial target re-
sponsibility systems. They raised required mediation target rates for
civil litigation.98 Since 2006, the same process has taken place in the
field of administrative litigation.99 Nor is this phenomenon limited to
courts. The full spectrum of Chinese government (and quasi-govern-
ment) entities engaged in dispute resolution-including local
governments, judicial bureaus, urban people's mediation committees,
and rural village committees-is being presented with elevated tar-
get ratios for cases successfully closed via mediation. Targets range
from merely high (sixty to eighty percent) to astronomically unbeliev-
able (ninety-seven percent or higher).100
93. Id.
94. See generally Minzner, supra note 49. Importantly, they have a range of inter-
nal limits and negative side effects. Id.
95. Chinese judges point this out. See, e.g., Meng, supra note 90; Chi Xiaoran,Qiantan minshi shenpan zhong tiaojie he panjue zhi jiehe [A Brief Discussion of Fus-
ing Mediation and Adjudication in Civil Trial Work] (comments by a Heilongjiang
judge), available at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleHtml/Article_43942.asp.
96. See Rizhao Intermediate People's Court Research Office, Shenpan fangshi
gaige daodi gaicheng shenmeyang [What Form Should Trial Reform Take After All],
Shandong shenpan [Shandong Trial], 1996 (setting a target for fifty percent of cases
to be resolved via decision).
97. For comments from the president of one Tianjin court, see Li Jianguo, Dui xin
shiqi fayuan minshi tiaojie gongzuo de diaocha yu sikao [Research and Thoughts on a
New Era of Civil Mediation Work], Dec. 7, 2005, available at http://tjfy.chinacourt.org/
public/detail.php?id=2268.
98. Id.; Meng, supra note 90.
99. HE HAIBO, SrHIZH FAZH1 ISUBSTANTIVE RULE OF LAw], 79-81 (2009).
100. Compare Wang Hongwei, Yichang jiufen, tiaojie haishi panjue [A Dispute, Me-
diate or Adjudicate?], LEGAL DAILY, Oct. 21, 2009 (detailing the requirement of the
Henan provincial High People's Court that between sixty and eighty percent of first
instance civil disputes be successfully mediated), available at http://www.legaldaily.
com.cn/mise/2009-10/19/content_1168114.htm, with Pujiang sifaju 2007 nian zhong-
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Methods can be very direct. In one northeastern Chinese district
court, judges who successfully mediate eighty-two percent of their
civil cases receive a bonus of ten yuan per mediated case, and five
yuan for each case withdrawn by the parties. Higher mediation rates
generate larger rewards. Judges who successfully mediate eighty-six
percent of their civil cases receive twenty yuan per mediated case,
and ten yuan for each case withdrawn by the parties. 01 Local court
officials report (also unsurprisingly) that such systems have been re-
sponsible for the large increases in cases resolved via mediation in
recent years. 102
These moves are part of a larger governance shift. Consistent
with increased concerns about social instability, central Chinese au-
thorities have ratcheted up pressure on lower-level Party and
government officials to prevent instances of citizens petitioning
(shangfang) to higher levels of the bureaucracy. Responsibility sys-
tems have been strengthened as a result. Local officials are receiving
increasingly severe sanctions for larger and more organized instances
of social protest by citizens in their jurisdictions.s03 This also extends
to the courts. Judges are being held individually liable for decisions
they issue that generate petitions by disgruntled litigants to higher
officials.' 04 Increased mediation targets are simply one component of
this broader shift. Party institutions are issuing comprehensive or-
ders to courts and other institutions instructing them to both keep
petitioners away from higher authorities at all costs, and to success-
fully resolve massive percentages of disputes through mediation.105
dian gongzuo zeren fenjie biao [Jinjiang Municipal Justice Bureau Chart Allocating
Responsibilities for Achieving Key Work Responsibilities for 2007] (making Wang Ji-
alang personally responsible for ensuring that ninety-seven percent of mediations
conducted by people's mediation committees in the city during 2007 are successful),
pg 2, available on the website of the Jinjiang municipal government at app.jinjiang.
gov.cn/jgov/files/2008/8/200882316950D601.doc.swf.
101. Muling Municipal People's Court Hearing Standards for Mediation in Civil
and Commercial Cases [Muling renmin fayuan minshang shi tiaojie anjian shenli
guifan], June 20, 2006, available at http://www.muling.gov.cn/xwzx/xwzxnr_2.asp?
id=7151.
102. See Meng, supra note 90 (reporting that the percentage of civil and commer-
cial cases resolved via mediation increased from 42.3 to 68.2% between 2003 and 2007
as a result of making mediation an "important" part of judicial evaluations and adopt-
ing a system for rewarding judges appropriately); Li, supra note 97 (noting a seven to
thirteen percent rise in the number of cases resolved via mediation in one year).
103. Carl Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions,
42 STAN. J. Ir'L L. 103, 134-35, 178-79 (2006).
104. Ma Yuhong, Zhongwei zhongyuan 'Qi bi' cu 'da xuexi, da taolun' [Zhongwei
Intermediate Court 'Seven Compares' Promotes 'Great Study, Great Discussion'], Sept.
17, 2008, Ningxia Court Net, available at http://www.nxfy.gov.cn/l/2008-9-17/
2920302@384.htm.
105. For one such example, see 2009 Nian kafa qu zongzhi, sifa, xinfang kaohe xize
[2009 Comprehensive Social Stability, Judicial, and Xinfang /Letters and Visits] Eval-
uation Details for the [Nantong Gangzha] Economic Development Zone] Mar. 2, 2009,
available at http://www.gzedz.gov.cn/jiguan/04/01/764809251420.html (setting
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Target responsibility systems coexist uneasily alongside formal
Chinese legal norms. Sometimes, the two move in tandem. During
the 1990s, judicial performance targets emphasizing trials and judg-
ments were strengthened, just as procedural and judicial legal
reforms created a framework that courts were supposed to use for
these purposes. In other cases, they clash.106 In recent years, Chinese
officials have increased mediation targets facing courts and judges,
but authorities have not amended the requirement under the 1991
Civil Procedure Law that mediation be voluntary; nor have they re-
moved the bar under the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (ALL)
on mediation in administrative proceedings. This creates tension.
Judges and courts are being rewarded (or disciplined) for actions that
do not correspond with legal norms.
The clash between law and target responsibility systems reflects
a much deeper tension in Chinese governance. Target responsibility
systems and personnel management structures are the beating heart
of Party control at each level of the Chinese bureaucracy. Unsurpris-
ingly, no clear institutional channels exist for working out conflicts
between personnel targets and law.' 07 In fact, the ALL specifically
bars courts from reviewing decisions of administrative organs regard-
ing personnel rewards or sanctions of their employees.' 08
III. WHAT ROAD AHEAD? IMPLICATIONS OF THE TURN AGAINST LAW
A. Practical Effects: A Destabilizing State-Society Interaction
The strategy currently employed by central Party leaders to
maintain short-term stability is actually undermining the long-term
development of China's legal norms and institutions.
Intense pressure on Chinese courts to resolve disputes via medi-
ation (rather than trial) creates problematic judicial behavior. One
example openly flagged by Chinese judges themselves: judges forcing
settlements on parties (qiangzhi tiaojie).109 This problem is not
unique to China. One of the classic criticisms of mediation is the fear
that the legal rights and interests of parties will be sacrificed, partic-
ularly when significant power imbalances prevent equal bargaining
targets for local authorities that include both limiting mass petitions and attaining a
ninety-six percent successful mediation rate for disputes).
106. See Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided
Cases: The Imperial Chinese Legal Heritage Lives On, 39 N.M. LAW. REv. 63 (2009)
(discussing the conflict between relevant SPC directives and court responsibility sys-
tems for "incorrectly decided" cases).
107. Minzner, supra note 49, at 94-97.
108. Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 14, art. 12(2, 3).
109. See, e.g., the comments of Wenshan Intermediate People's Court judge Li Yaj-
ing, Woguo minshi susong tiaojie cunzai de wenti ji wanshan tujing [Existing
Problems With Mediation in Chinese Civil Cases and Avenues for Addressing Them],
Yunnan Province Court Net, Oct. 23, 2008, available at http://www.gy.yn.gov.cn/Arti-
cle/sflt/fglt/200810/8080.html.
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between parties.110 This can lead to courts simply ratifying mediated
agreements that are manifestly unfair. These concerns are massively
exacerbated when the salary and career evaluations of the judge who
is conducting the mediation are directly tied to reaching settlement.
In such cases, the judge herself may twist the arms of parties in order
to meet her own performance targets. This detracts from the substan-
tive fairness of the process and undermines the legitimacy of the
court system.
This, however, is just the tip of the iceberg. The social stability
pressures being placed upon Chinese courts and other institutions
are fueling a much more complex and destabilizing state-society in-
teraction. Two examples help illustrate this point.
Take the field of anti-discrimination. Chinese hepatitis and
AIDS activists use the legal system to seek redress and push for insti-
tutional change. National Chinese law bars employers from
discriminating against carriers of contagious diseases.""' But the
SPC has not yet recognized an individual right of action (anyou) on
these grounds. Actually gathering evidence from corporate or govern-
ment entities to prove they have engaged in discrimination remains
difficult. Both of these factors present serious difficulties for anti-dis-
crimination activists seeking to use litigation channels.
But official pressure on judges to reach mediated settlements
and avoid citizen petitions creates openings for civil society activists.
One of the leading Chinese anti-discrimination organizations em-
ploys savvy media strategies and expressions of social discontent to
bring significant pressure on judges in mediation proceedings. Con-
cerned with negative performance evaluations under target
responsibility systems, judges then apply pressure on defendants to
make concessions in closed-door mediation proceedings even when
there is no legal basis for them to do so.11 2 Eroding Chinese legal
structures and weakening formal legal norms can thus actually in-
crease opportunities for some plaintiffs to press their cases-at least
for those capable of mobilizing civil society or media pressure.
Labor grievances provide a second example. Yang Su and Xin He
detail how top-down pressures on courts to deal with social unrest
affect judicial treatment of labor grievances by workers seeking back
pay from their employers.11 3 Facing severe career sanctions under
target responsibility systems for failing to handle street protests,
110. For criticism of American mediation practices in domestic violence cases, see
Aimee Davis, Mediating Cases Involving Domestic Violence: Solution or Setback, 8
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 253, 279-81 (2006).
111. P.R.C. Employment Promotion Law, issued Aug. 30, 2007, art. 30, available at
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-08/31/content_732597.htm.
112. Interview, Beijing, June 28, 2010.
113. Yang Su & Xin He, Street as Courtroom: State Accommodation of Labor Pro-
test in South China, 44 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 157 (2010).
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southern Chinese "courts in such circumstances become less con-
cerned with their own procedural requirements than with the
imperative dictated by the stability doctrine."11 4 They "completely
neglect the neutral position that a court is supposed to assume""15
and throw legal norms out the window in their effort to reach a settle-
ment. This includes abandoning evidentiary and procedural
standards, independently assisting workers to bring their grievances,
and ordering unrelated parties (bearing no actual legal liability) to
assume the burden of paying workers' wages." 6 Such court actions
are part of coordinated Party responses that aim to "buy off' social
unrest through tactical concessions. This includes court or govern-
ment authorities literally paying protesting workers out of their own
official budgets to get them off the streets."17
One might think that these are positive examples of change. He-
roic anti-discrimination activists obtain redress. Suffering workers
receive compensation. But look deeper. This state-society dynamic
does not generate meaningful long-term institutional change or in-
creased social stability. Rather, it is a short-term reaction to
particular expressions of social unrest or public outrage, not a re-
sponse to the underlying causes.
Indeed, this isn't even what Chinese activists themselves want.
As the head of the anti-discrimination organization mentioned above
notes, neither their strategies nor the government responses they
prompt are viable long-term solutions to underlying institutional
problems. Media pressure cannot be mobilized in every case. Civil so-
ciety organizations cannot make every individual violation of citizen
rights a cause cglkbre. Rather, he notes, "what we need is for the gov-
ernment to develop standards to handle these problems in a
regularized manner.""i8
But that is not what Chinese authorities are doing. Instead, they
are forcing individual parties to make concessions in closed-door pro-
ceedings as a means of addressing cases that attract significant social
attention or that generate petitions by disgruntled parties. If civil
and administrative dispute resolution norms simply devolve to oiling
the loudest and squeakiest wheel in every case, what is left of the
Chinese legal system?1 9
114. Id. at 174.
115. Id. at 167.
116. Id., at 157-70.
117. Su, He, and Liebman note the creation of designated "social stability" funds
within courts and governments for precisely this aim-paying off petitioners. Id. at
168. Liebman, supra note 29, at 13, 24.
118. Interview, Beijing, June 28, 2010.
119. It is unclear how the shift in Chinese dispute resolution practices will affect
the interests of foreign corporations in China. Disputes involving such entities do not
commonly end up in Chinese courts. Rather, Chinese arbitration commissions have
emerged as alternative fora for foreign corporations seeking to resolve their disputes.
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Such policies have long-term ramifications. In any legal system,
most grievances (if not simply dropped) are privately settled in the
shadow of the law-with the parties resolving their disputes based
partly on their perceptions of what the outcome might be if they took
it to courts or other formal legal institutions.12 0 Formal legal norms
or publicly adjudicated cases provide standards against which indi-
vidual parties can bargain. In such a situation, overwhelmingly high
percentages of mediated or settled cases are not necessarily cause for
concern. A hypothetical rate of ninety-nine percent of mediated or
settled cases might suggest that the remaining one percent of cases
are providing disputants with sufficient information as to the likely
success of their disputes via formal channels, enabling them to pri-
vately reach an acceptable settlement.
In China, the reverse is taking place. Not only does intense pres-
sure on judges to ward off petitions by dissatisfied parties or to attain
high mediation rates affect the cases that are mediated, it also mean
that the cases which are adjudicated are decided in the shadow of
responsibility systems and the fear of social protest. As Ben Liebman
has noted, this is fueling a "populist threat" to Chinese courts.121
These policies are also sending dangerous signals to disputants.
Official judicial responses that represent simple tactical concessions
to particular instances of popular protest undermine existing legal
norms and institutions. Disgruntled parties (regardless of the under-
lying validity of their complaint) quite logically conclude that staging
a coordinated internet protest or launching a mass petition of hun-
dreds of disgruntled farmers to the provincial capital stands a better
chance of getting what they want rather than actually using legal
channels. This dynamic has severe long-term implications for social
stability. 122
Further, it isn't clear that the current high-pressure emphasis on
judicial mediation even helps Chinese authorities meaningfully re-
solve disputes in the short-term. Take one of the key official
rationales advanced for the shift toward mediation: the presumably
higher voluntary execution rates associated with mediated agree-
ments. Local Chinese courts face pervasive difficulties enforcing their
Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 31 (2006);
Fuyong Chen, Striving for Independence, Competence, and Fairness: A Case Study of
the Beijing Arbitration Commission, 18 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 313 (2007). Such commer-
cial disputes may remain somewhat insulated from the social stability pressures that
are reshaping Chinese courts. Of course, Chinese arbitration proceedings remain
characterized by their own procedural problems. See id.; Jerome A. Cohen, Time to
Fix China's Arbitration, FAR EASTERN ECON. R., Jan.-Feb. 2005, available at http:l
www.feer.com/articlesl/2005/0501/free/pO3l.html.
120. See, e.g., Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
121. Liebman, supra note 29.
122. Minzner, supra note 103.
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decisions as a result of limited resources and low institutional stand-
ing.123 Top Chinese judicial authorities emphasize that the shift
toward mediation will help solve such enforcement difficulties. 1 2 4
Theoretically, this makes sense. Since judicial mediation supposedly
represents a voluntary settlement by parties, acceptance of the out-
come should be easier and execution rates for mediated decisions
should be higher than adjudicated court decisions. After all, the par-
ties agreed themselves to settle the dispute, right?
Well, no. Once Chinese courts and judges start aggressively
pushing mediation in order to meet their own performance targets,
these assumptions go out the window. As the voluntary nature of me-
diation itself declines, levels of voluntary compliance also start to go
down. Parties begin to have second thoughts about agreements that
they were pushed into signing. Plaintiffs begin to discover an increas-
ingly wide gap between the compensation they received in court
mediation proceedings and what they are entitled under law. They
begin to contest mediation agreements, despite their binding nature
under Chinese law.125 As a result, enforcement problems reemerge.
The extent of this phenomenon can be partially gauged by comparing
the percentages of judicially mediated cases and adjudicated cases
that are submitted to court enforcement tribunals for compulsory en-
forcement (qiangzhi zhixing). In several Beijing courts, the numbers
are roughly equal-between thirty and fifty percent. In one, the rate
of voluntary compliance with court decisions (sixty-three percent) ac-
tually exceeds that for judicially mediated settlements (fifty-six
percent).126
Alternative dispute resolution succeeds when it truly represents
an "alternative" to litigation. It allows for the resolution of those
cases that can (and should) be resolved through channels such as me-
diation. But that is not the case when alternative dispute resolution
becomes an artificial panacea for social stability, when Chinese
courts face hard numerical targets for preventing petitions to higher
authorities and for successfully mediating cases, and when litigation
channels are simply shut in the face of disgruntled parties. At that
point, the "alternative" in alternative dispute resolution vanishes.
When that happens, all of the problems associated with litigation
123. Xin He, Enforcing Commercial Judgments in the Pearl River Delta of China,
57 Am. J. COMP. L. 419 (2009).
124. Chen Fei, Wang Shengiun: Zhuzhong yunyong tiaojie shouduan jiejue susong
nan, zhixing nan wenti [Wang Shengiun: Emphasize the Use of Mediation to Resolve
Litigation and Enforcement Difficulties], XINHUA, July 28, 2009, available at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2009-07/28/content_11788407.htm.
125. Jiaqi Ling, The Enforcement of Mediation Settlement Agreements in China, 19
Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 489, 495-99 (2008).
126. Li Gang, Fayuan "tiaojie" rongyi, zhixing nan [Court "Mediation" Easy, En-forcement Hard], BEIJING YOUTH DAILY, July 7, 2010, available at http://
bjyouth.ynet.com/articlejsp?oid=67378947.
2011] 963
HeinOnline  -- 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 963 2011
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
that Chinese officials are seeking to avoid-weak institutional legiti-
macy of courts and difficulties enforcing verdicts-simply re-emerge
in new forms.
What do Chinese lawyers and scholars themselves think about
the official shift against law? It depends on who you ask, and how
tightly tied they are to the Party-state apparatus. The official propa-
ganda line details miraculous successes in resolving grievances with
no negative consequences. An academic expert on mediation who is
enjoying increasing official attention as a result of the shift in govern-
ment policy describes "isolated implementation problems" involving
forced mediation. 127 A Beijing local people's congress representative
carefully expresses more critical views. He warns that there is a real
risk of "excessively emphasizing mediation," that "law must be used
as a ruler for determining settlements," and that the failure to do so
will simply generate more petitions by disgruntled citizens.1 28
Unsurprisingly, the harshest criticism comes from liberal Chi-
nese legal scholars and public interest lawyers. They are very
depressed. They view the current track as a complete repudiation of
the reforms on which they have worked over recent years. "There has
been a serious regression from five to ten years ago."129 "I have com-
pletely lost the idealism I had in the late 1990s regarding courts and
the law."1 3 0
B. A Comparative Look: Similar, but Different
China's shift away from trials and toward mediation is not en-
tirely unique. Parties in many countries face prohibitive litigation
costs. National judiciaries are grappling with overloaded court dock-
ets that result in lengthy trial delays. Many nations are consequently
experimenting with alternatives to court adjudication. These range
from efforts (such as in the Philippines) to revive traditional village
dispute-resolution institutions,13  to those (such as in Argentina)
aimed at importing court-connected mediation models from
abroad. 132
With regard to developing countries, a "backlash" narrative has
emerged from the law-and-development and law-and-society move-
ments to partially explain these shifts. This narrative stresses how
127. Interview, Beijing, July 11, 2010.
128. Interview, Beijing, July 14, 2010.
129. Interview, Xi'an, June 21, 2010.
130. Interview, Beijing, July 13, 2010.
131. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, James A. Wall, Jr. & Wan Yan, Philippine Commu-
nity Mediation, Katarungang Pambarangay, 2 J. DiSP. RESOL. 501 (2008).
132. Timothy K. Kuhner, Court-Connected Mediation Compared: The Cases of Ar-
gentina and the United States, 11 ILSA J Iwr'L & COMP L 519 (2005). For a look at
Indian reform efforts, see Hiram Chodosh, Stephen A. Mayo, A.M. Ahmadi &
Abhishek M. Singhvi, Indian Civil Justice System Reform: Limitation and Preserva-
tion of the Adversarial Process, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 1 (1997/1998).
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imported Western rule-of-law reforms (regarding law, litigation, and
courts) pushed by international NGOs or multinational organizations
such as the World Bank mesh poorly with local realities in practice.
Reforms fail. This failure generates a counter-reaction in the form of
experiments (or calls for such) with traditional or community media-
tion institutions that respond better to local conditions. Such a
depiction informs both the received wisdom regarding the failures of
the law-and-development movement in Latin America during the
1960s and 1970s,133 and criticism of the modern global rule-of-law
movement made by scholars such as Brian Tamanaha.134
Superficially, at least, it is also possible to explain the official
Chinese shift against the law through precisely this rubric. Indeed,
as early as 2000, Matthew Stephenson warned that:
"[I]f [Chinese] legal reform undermines the informal institu-
tions [such as mediation] that [groups such as the poor] have
evolved to protect their interests, [legal reforms] cannot
work. Even worse, if the unintended consequences create es-
pecially serious social problems, there may be a backlash
against reforms."135
Precisely this view-that late twentieth century legal reforms
are a poor fit for Chinese conditions-informs arguments made by
foreign scholars such as Randall Peerenboom, as well as by the Chi-
nese Party authorities who are currently leading the shift against
law.136
A second effort to understand Chinese developments through a
comparative lens emphasizes the extent to which the shift against
trials and litigation is part of a broader worldwide phenomenon. In-
deed, the United States is not exempt from these trends. As Marc
Galanter has shown, American federal and state courts experienced a
long decline in the percentage of cases resolved by trials over the
twentieth century.'37 Since the 1980s, this has been also coupled
with a steep drop-off in the absolute number of cases resolved
through trial. 138 This has led to a dramatic growth of the number of
cases resolved through alternative means, such as out-of-court settle-
133. David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Re-
flections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974
Wis. L. Rev. 1062 (1974).
134. Brian Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Devel-
opment (forthcoming).
135. Matthew Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?: Problems and
Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored "Rule of Law" Reform Projects in the People's Republic of
China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64 (2000).
136. Peerenboom, supra note 43, at 10-11.
137. Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1255-62 (2005) (noting that 19.9% of federal court cases were
terminated by trial in 1938, compared with 1.7% in 2003).
138. Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials, 2006 J. Dise. RESOL. 7, 13 (2006).
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ments. These trends are intertwined with efforts to press for the
creation of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) institutions within
American courts (such as the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act and the
1998 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act).
What explains the American shift away from trials? With regard
to the long-term decline: resource constraints. Since the early twenti-
eth century, the United States has experienced rapid growth in both
legal regulation and the numbers of lawyers. Barriers excluding mi-
norities from access to courts have eroded. These factors led to a
surge in efforts to rely on the courts to resolve grievances. But growth
in judicial resources has not kept pace. The result has been an in-
crease in court backlogs, trial delays, and litigation expenses. This
has made litigants more willing to look for other mechanisms (such
as mediation or settlement) to resolve their disputes.' 39
Different factors explain the rapid short-term decline in Ameri-
can trials over the last three decades. To use Galanter's phrase, the
United States has experienced a broad "turn against law" since the
1970s.140 Law, lawyers, and litigation have fallen in disrepute. On
the left, the bar and legal institutions came under fire for supporting
entrenched interests and inadequately protecting the rights of the
underprivileged. This critique helped spawn the modern ADR move-
ment. On the right, corporate interests and conservative politicians
attempted to roll back what they viewed as the liberal excesses of the
1950s and 1960s.141 Specific reforms limited the role of courts in ad-
dressing grievances, by restricting plaintiff standing, individual
rights, and tort liability.142 Both movements contributed to reducing
the numbers of court cases brought to trial-the former through pro-
viding alternative fora for their resolution, the latter through
shutting the courthouse door.
These developments fueled deeper ideological shifts. Beginning
in the 1970s, "too much law" emerged as a prevailing critique of the
American legal system. Litigation began to be perceived as a "pathol-
ogy."14 3 It was a symptom to be cured, rather than a natural
component of the legal and political system, or (as in the 1960s) an
important tool to redress social injustice. Self-perceptions of federal
judges and court administrators shifted as well. They embraced the
view that their job was to actively promote settlements, rather than
to take cases toward trial or enforce public norms.144 Beginning in
the 1990s, the perceived need to "cure" the American legal system of
litigation spawned institutional reform movements such as "thera-
139. Id., at 13.
140. Galanter, supra note 2.
141. Id., at 287-99.
142. Galanter, supra note 137, at 1269-72.
143. Galanter, supra note 2, at 302-04.
144. Galanter, supra note 137, at 1266.
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peutic jurisprudence" and "problem-solving courts." 145 These
movements explicitly de-emphasize reliance on adversarial litigation
and trials. And they seek to redefine the role of lawyers away from
solely focusing on the legal rights of their clients.
Just as in China, these changes have sparked critical commen-
tary. American scholars have warned against embracing settlement
as the penultimate goal of court work. They call for careful evaluation
to ensure that court settlement and ADR practices conform to norms
regarding the administration of justice. 1 4 6 Others caution against ap-
plying a "one-size-fits-all" approach, identifying a range of cases
(such as domestic violence) where resort to mediation may be inap-
propriate. 147 The problem-solving court and therapeutic
jurisprudence movements have come under fire for overlooking par-
ties' rights to due process and zealous representation.14 8 Critics have
proposed providing clearer guidance for judges, to ensure that judi-
cial pro-settlement policies do not violate explicit bars in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Model Code of Judicial Ethics
against coercing parties to settle. 149
Chinese and American developments have some similarities. Re-
source constraints and efficiency concerns are prompting authorities
in both countries to look for alternatives to litigation. Scholars and
activists are honestly looking for better ways to respond to citizen
problems. And current shifts against law in both the United States
and China reflect counter-reactions by elites with vested interests
(American corporations concerned with their litigation liability, Chi-
nese Party leaders concerned with challenges to social stability and
their rule) to earlier periods in which access to the judiciary was
greatly expanded and courts were charged with hearing a much
wider range of civil and administrative grievances.
Parallels between China and other developing countries are also
visible. Gaps between legal norms (often imported) and actual reali-
ties are becoming clearer. In the first exhilarating infatuation with
145. DAVID WEXLER, REHABILITATING LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURIS-
PRUDENCE FOR CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE (2008); JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (David Wexler & Bruce Winick eds.,
2003); Mae Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of Dis-
course and Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J. L. & POLICY 57
(2009).
146. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, 'Most Cases Settle': Judicial Promotion and Reg-
ulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1387-91 (1994).
147. Davis, supra note 110, at 279-81.
148. Mae Quinn, An RSVP to Professor Wexler's Warm Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Invitation to the Criminal Defense Bar: Unable to Join You, Already (Somewhat Simi-
larly) Engaged, 48 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REv. 539 (2007).
149. See Sylvia Shweder, Judicial Limitations in ADR: The Role and Ethics of
Judges Encouraging Settlements, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 51, 66-71 (2007) (propos-
ing listing "downgrading the merits of one party's case," and "speaking directly to one
party" as examples of specific judicial conduct that should be clarified to constitute
inappropriate coercive behavior).
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legal reform (whether in Latin America during the 1960s, or in China
during the 1990s), it is easy to overlook such gaps. Observers natu-
rally focus on exciting developments (new Labor Law passed!) as
evidence of rapid change. But as time passes, discrepancies emerge.
Because of the "connectedness of law" to the rest of society, legal re-
forms trigger reactions from other social forces, such as elite
interests. These mute the content of the original reforms. Implemen-
tation stalls. And formerly breathtaking developments remain little
more than yellowed documents (or outdated web pages) stashed in
the forgotten corners of government bureaus. 50
But key differences exist as well. First, China does not fit the
paradigm offered by law-and-society scholars and law-and-develop-
ment critics. Outsiders did not impose late twentieth century legal
reforms on China. Rather, after the chaos of the Maoist years, Chi-
nese leaders themselves decided that they wanted to revise their
institutions. They pursued legal reform to address problems they per-
ceived.' 5 ' Foreign actors involved in the process, such as the
American Bar Association or the Yale-China Law Center, have al-
ways been secondary partners invited to participate by Chinese
authorities who have themselves controlled the pace, speed, and con-
tent of reforms.
China's shift against law is consequently an indigenous rejection
by Chinese leaders of their own reforms, not of externally imposed
ones. Ironically, it is these late twentieth century legal Chinese re-
forms that Tamanaha cites as a successful example of self-directed
legal development, and that he contrasts with failed rule-of-law pro-
grams imposed by outsiders elsewhere in the developing world. 152
Now it is precisely these Chinese reforms that are going under the ax.
Second, the current rejection of legal reforms is being driven by
Chinese leaders, not by society at large. Contrary to Stephenson's
warning, ordinary Chinese citizens are not stampeding in droves out
of courtrooms toward mediation channels. The picture is much more
mixed. In a series of 2001-02 surveys, Benjamin Read and Ethan
Michelson found that disputants in developed areas of China were
much less likely to seek assistance from third-party mediation insti-
tutions, such as residents committees, than they were to approach
formal legal institutions such as lawyers and courts. 53 The surveys,
conducted during the height of the official emphasis on litigation and
150. Tamanaha, supra note 134, at 34.
151. These efforts overlap in part with broader trends of China voluntarily adopt-
ing some international norms in the post-reform period. See, e.g., Wang Hongying,
"Linking Up With the International Track": What's in a Slogan? 189 CHINA QUAR-
TERLY 1 (2007).
152. Tamanaha, supra note 134, at 52-53.
153. Benjamin Read & Ethan Michelson, Mediating the Mediation Debate, 52 J. or
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 737, 751 (2008).
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trials, revealed a reasonably high level of urban satisfaction with the
formal legal system. Two-thirds of Beijing residents who had actually
used the courts reported that the experience met their expectations
both with regard to substance and process.154 With respect to devel-
oped urban areas, this is hardly evidence of a widespread backlash by
Chinese society against 1990s-era court reforms that might justify
the official shift against law.
Of course, there is an important caveat: the picture in rural ar-
eas is dramatically different. Rural Chinese report overwhelmingly
negative experiences with courts.155 They report much higher levels
of satisfaction with village mediation in resolving their disputes. 5 6
Michelson and Read find that rural residents are experiencing what
Mary Gallagher has termed "informed disenchantment" with the for-
mal Chinese legal system.'5 7 Real-life encounters of rural residents
with courts are reducing their confidence in and support for the for-
mal Chinese legal system. Michelson consequently advises that
dispute resolution reform efforts in rural China "should not be con-
centrated solely on opening up the courts," but should ensure that
rural residents continue to enjoy "access to local, informal solutions
that appear to work relatively effectively."'5 8
So, even if the new policies represent a top-down, Party-led rejec-
tion of late twentieth century reforms, and even if it appears to
contradict the demands of urban Chinese residents, might the turn
against law still be an entirely reasonable Party response to practical
problems facing rural Chinese society?
This question leads us to a third difference between Chinese de-
velopments and the "backlash" narrative offered by law-and-society
and law-and-development scholars. Take the need for strengthening
village dispute resolution forums in rural China as a given. Grant the
law-and-society critique regarding the need to develop indigenous in-
stitutions (rather than transplanting foreign legal norms) as part of
the development process. For the sake of argument, even accept pre-
vailing American normative biases in favor of viewing litigation as a
154. Ethan Michelson & Benjamin Read, Public Attitudes Towards Official Justice
in Beijing and Rural China (forthcoming), at 11.
155. Roughly sixty percent of rural respondents having experience with courts re-
port that it fails to meet their expectations with regard to either substance or process.
Id.
156. Read & Michelson, supra note 153, table 7, at 758 (noting that only forty-
seven percent of rural respondents reported that their experiences with the legal sys-
tem met or exceeded their expectations, compared with sixty-nine percent of
respondents reporting the same with regard to village committees).
157. Michelson & Read, supra note 154, at 28; Mary Gallagher, Mobilizing the Law
in China: "Informed Disenchantment" and the Development of Legal Consciousness, 40
LAw & Soc'y REV. 783 (2006).
158. Ethan Michelson, Popular Attitudes Towards Dispute Processing in Urban
and Rural China, THE FOUNDATION FOR LAw, JUSTICE, AND SOCIETY, 7-8 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Michelson%231%23.pdf.
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disease that needs to be "cured" through building mediation institu-
tions. Even if all of these assumptions are correct, they are still of
limited relevance to understanding the current shifts in the Chinese
judiciary. Because that is not what Chinese authorities are doing.
The main focus of the new official policy line is not on building the
types of alternative institutions that all of these arguments suggest
are necessary. Nor is it a careful experiment with "dejudicializing" a
limited number of disputes.159 Instead it is a political rectification of
the Chinese judiciary, carried out in the name of social stability, and
implemented via Party propaganda campaigns and strengthened re-
sponsibility targets for petitioning and mediation.
Now, this is where it gets tricky. Despite the highly politicized
cast of the new policy line, official Chinese efforts to strengthen medi-
ation will probably not be entirely negative in result. The Chinese
bureaucracy is like a large cruise ship. Central authorities have
firmly shoved the rudder of legal reform in a new (and problematic)
direction. This is generating a bubbling and turbulent wake of ac-
tions among local Chinese authorities. Many of these measures will
simply be aimed at papering over social stability pressures that are
deforming Chinese judicial institutions by endowing them with the
mantra of ADR. But some reforms may be positive. After all, once the
fiction of magically resolving all disputes via mediation miracle work-
ers fades, it is local authorities who are stuck with the practical
problem of what to do with disgruntled people who are upset with
each other or with the state. Some officials will choose suppression.
Others, however, will experiment with meaningfully strengthening
quasi-autonomous village mediation institutions in exactly the way
159. Peerenboom downplays the shift against law. He portrays this as a limited
and "judicious" response involving carefully "dejudicializing" "growing pains and po-
litically sensitive cases," and suggests that this "will, and should be limited to certain
areas." But he undermines his own argument (and confirms the broad nature of the
current shift against law) by acknowledging that such cases include
civil cases where people are not happy with results because of the perceived
lack of competence of judges, actual or suspected corruption, the feeling that
laws are at odds with local norms, difficulties in enforcing the judgment, or
simply the plaintiffs lack of understanding or unrealistically high expecta-
tions of what a legal system can do.
Peerenboom, supra note 43. That, of course, includes almost every dispute. For a re-
cent SPC directive which directly contradicts Peerenboom's assessment, laying out
the extremely sweeping extent of current mediation policies, see Zuigao renmin
fayuan guanyu jinyibu guanche "tiaojie youxian, tiaopan jiehe" gongzuo yuanze de
ruogan yijian" [SPC Opinion on Further Carrying Out Work Principles Regarding
"Mediation Has Priority, and Mediation and Trial Should Be Fused], June 7, 2010,
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-06/28/c_12271040.htm. Similarly,
the politicized cast of official mediation efforts and the reliance on target responsibil-
ity systems also call into question arguments that existing policies are an authentic
reflection of timeworn Chinese "historical and cultural roots." Waye & Ping, supra
note 39, at 32.
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that scholars have suggested is necessary.' 60 The coming years will
witness a range of reforms-good and bad-proceeding under the ru-
bric of mediation and ADR. The challenge will be to distinguish
between them. 161
What are the practical implications of this analysis for outside
observers looking at China through a comparative lens?
First, keep a clear head in looking at China. It is easy for coun-
tries like China to become exotified Others for those who are
discontented with the deficiencies of their own legal systems, and
who are searching for an imagined (and superior) reality to raise up
in opposition to the perceived evils of their own systems. At least one
American scholar has specifically proposed importing "Chinese court-
performed mediation" into U.S. federal courts.162 Mediation certainly
has benefits. This author would be among the first to point out the
need for Americans to broaden their vision and learn from other
countries. But before blindly importing Chinese mediation practices
(or setting up social stability preservation offices to coordinate gov-
ernmental responses to dissatisfied litigants), one must make sure to
understand how they actually operate in China.
Second, foreign scholars and NGOs need to exercise a good deal
of care in working on Chinese ADR issues over the next several years.
Chinese institutions are reaching out to foreign scholars and interna-
tional institutions for input with regard to their reforms. Mediation is
now heavily promoted in U.S. government rule-of-law programs.
Scholars tout it as a key component for spreading the rule of law in-
ternationally.163 Others emphasize the need to explore alternatives
to state law in reform efforts.164 As these trends merge, it is impor-
tant not to make simplistic assumptions that mediation here equals
mediation there. It is also important to bear in mind the particular
context in which mediation is being advanced and practiced. In the
words of one Chinese public interest lawyer:
160. Michelson, supra note 158, at 9. Of course, questions still exist whether this is
a long-term solution to all rural Chinese disputes. Certainly some disputes (say, land
conflicts involving local township authorities) would seem to be less amenable to reso-
lution through village mediation.
161. When in doubt, ask what responsibility targets mediators and government
officials face and consider what behavioral incentives might result.
162. See Michael Colatrella, 'Court-Performed' Mediation in the People's Republic
of China: A Proposed Model to Improve the United States Federal District Courts' Me-
diation Programs, 15 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 391, 415 (2000). In Colatrella's
defense, he does say that "there is evidence that the court-performed nature of [the
Chinese] system would translate well to the federal courts, but a wholesale applica-
tion of China's process would be inconsistent with longstanding values underlying the
American judiciary." Id. For an example of an American state supreme court judge
gazing at Chinese mediation practices and bemoaning excessive American litigation,
see Justice Robert Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, 62 WASH. L. REV. 383 (1987).
163. Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule
of Law? Lessons from Abroad, 56 DEPAuL L. REV. 569 (2007).
164. Tamanaha, supra note 134.
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Foreign mediation experts who come to China may know a
lot about mediation. But they just don't see how it is being
used here. These foreign experts talk about the benefits of
mediation-how it can save time and expense. But in some
cases, Chinese judges are pressing us to mediate after they
have actually conducted a full trial-they do not want to is-
sue a decision. They do this to protect their own judicial
evaluations, raise their mediation rates, and guard against
negative consequences of verdicts that are appealed or that
generate citizen petitions (shangfang). Judicial mediation as
practiced actually drags the process out and adds to the ex-
pense. Many foreign experts just don't get that.165
It is easy to look at litigation as "pathological" and reflexively
cheer for ADR when one's system actually has other, well-established
channels for holding officials accountable or resolving conflicts be-
tween citizens. But when the national shift toward mediation is tied
to a broader politicized takedown of the key institutions that have
been playing those roles over recent decades, it is essential to be
nuanced and careful.
C. The Turn Away from Law: Is Legal Education Next?
In the face of the recent shift away from legal norms and ideals
held out as models since the 1980s and 1990s, one field has remained
relatively immune, at least so far: legal education. Despite the
mounting pressure on courts and lawyers to redefine themselves in
accordance with the new (or revived) ideals of Party leadership and
populist responsiveness, Chinese law schools have continued to churn
out graduates largely educated in formal law. Chinese law profes-
sors-many with overseas experience in the West or Japan-
continue to reflect the values of the late twentieth century reform era
in which they were trained. Their research and writing tends to em-
phasize the importance of formal law. Many strongly oppose the
changes currently sweeping through China's legal system. How long
can this disconnect persist?
Perhaps not long. Chinese authorities are taking steps to extend
the rollback against late twentieth century legal reforms into class-
rooms. Beginning in the fall of 2010, students in China's political
science and law (zhengfa) universities had a mandatory class on "So-
cialist Rule of Law" added to their studies, pursuant to a joint
directive by Party political-legal, propaganda, and education authori-
ties. Students use a textbook compiled under the guidance of the
165. Interview, Beijing, July 13, 2010.
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former head of the central Party political-legal committee.166 These
reforms are likely to expand. Training sessions on "socialist rule of
law" have begun for young faculty members at law schools through-
out China. 167
What these educational changes will actually involve remains
unclear. "Socialist rule of law" is a mushy concept. Authorities have
reduced it to a series of contradictory slogans that echo those cur-
rently reverberating through the judiciary and other institutions.s68
Comments made by key supporters of the "socialist rule of law" (such
as the former dean of the Beijing University law school) emphasize
that it is intended to emphasize social stability. It is explicitly in-
tended as a contrast with "Western rule-of-law" concepts that are
deemed inappropriate for China. It aims to direct scholarly attention
away from book learning, in order to focus on and learn from China's
own characteristics, historical circumstances, and practical reali-
ties.169 Some academics have embraced these calls. Rejecting the
prevailing orthodoxy in Chinese legal academia regarding the impor-
tance of formal law, litigation, and legal institutions, they have lent
their support to an alternative vision, pushing for increased empha-
sis on mediation and alternative dispute resolution practices in
Chinese law schools and training programs for judges.170
These efforts are unleashing deep conflicts in faculty meetings
throughout China. Many Chinese legal academics are politically lib-
eral, remain committed to earlier reform-era legal norms, and resist
these shifts. Some oppose any effort to skew the content of higher
education for political purposes. They view such moves as a swing
away from the partial de-politicization of higher education over the
past several decades, and a reversion to pre-1978 Maoist practices.
Others, such as civil litigation and civil procedure professors, have
more direct objections. They view the turn away from litigation and
toward mediation and de-professionalization as a frontal attack on
the relevance of their fields (and careers).' 7 1
Just to be clear: this is not a simplistic conflict between "good"
liberal law professors who support litigation and "bad" Party officials
or academics who support mediation. Many of the critiques of the
166. Zhao Lei, "Shehui zhuyi fazhi" in jiaocai, in ketang, in naodai, ["Socialist
Rule of Law" to Enter Textbooks, Classrooms, Minds], SOUTHERN WEEKEND, Nov. 11,
2009, available at http://www.infzm.com/content/37227.
167. Interviews, supra notes 130-33.
168. Specifically, "rule the country according to law, enforce the law in the popular
interest, [uphold] equality and justice, serve the overall situation [i.e., not narrow
legal technicalities], [uphold] Party leadership." Zhao, supra note 166.
169. Zhu Suli, Shehui zhuyi fazhi linian yu ziben zhuyi fazhi sixiang de bijiao [A
Comparison Between the Concept of Socialist Rule of Law and Capitalist Rule of Law
Thought], XINHUA, June 17, 2008, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-
06/17/content_8386868.htm.
170. Interview, Beijing, July 11, 2010.
171. Id.
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1990s-era legal reforms have merit. Excessive reliance on imported
legal norms and institutions may not respond fully to the needs of
rural China. Many Chinese academics (like their counterparts over-
seas) remain occupied with theoretical ruminations that have little
relevance to practical reality. Carefully considered mediation policies
could help improve dispute resolution in China. Indeed, if these criti-
ques were raised in the context of a nuanced, balanced discussion, it
might help address many of the pressing problems facing China
today.
But that is not what is happening. These shifts are taking place
against the backdrop of an official political campaign reconsidering
the role of law-a campaign sponsored by Party authorities for
overtly political purposes. This is beginning to narrow the room left
for open academic debate. Academics who oppose these policies or
work on fields that do not accord with them (such as constitutional-
ism) are finding their conferences canceled, and research funds
unavailable. Those who support the official line are finding their
stars rise. This is affecting scholarly output. Chinese ADR specialists
are reframing their views to parrot central slogans and policies. 172
Two dangers exist if China's turn away from law continues to
expand in the educational realm. First, it may lead to the silencing of
voices calling for the concept of law as an institution for resolving
civil grievances between citizens, or as a tool for limiting government
power. Of course, whether this qualifies as a "danger" may depend on
one's political views.
Second, it may create a problematic "echo chamber" effect. What
happens if increasing numbers of scholars searching for funding, pro-
motions, or official recognition join the bandwagon of the politically
approved line? Discussion will narrow. There will be a proliferation of
academic articles and government-funded research projects with ti-
tles such as "Further Outstanding Successes in Building the Socialist
Rule of Law: Rural Township in Gansu Province Achieves 'World
Without Litigation'." Continue these trends far and long enough, and
the role of Chinese legal academia as one of the few institutions able
to (at least partially) speak truth to power could be degraded, gripped
by a new legal orthodoxy that chokes off open discussion. Central
Chinese leaders themselves would suffer. They will find themselves
in a house of mirrors, lacking any objective means to gauge the suc-
172. Compare the content of the Chen Yanping propaganda campaign with the in-
troduction to a recent textbook on alternative dispute resolution (stating that the
ideal of a "world without litigation" is not a concept lacking in actual evidence, that
some local mediation committees have indeed successfully achieved Party goals of so-
cial stability in ensuring that "small problems don't leave the village, and large
problems don't leave the township," and that alternative dispute resolution practices
can help realize classical Chinese Confucian governance ideals better than adver-
sarial litigation). FAN Yu & Li HAo, JIUFEN JIEJUE [DISPUTE RESOLUTION], at iii-vii
(2010).
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cess or failure of their own policies, with tame scholars and
sycophantic local officials merely reflecting back a distorted Panglos-
sian version of reality.
D. Whither the Study of Chinese Law: Back to the Future?
We also need to reconceptualize the academic study of Chinese
law. We should recognize that we have entered a "third wave" of
scholarship, and call into question prior assumptions dominating the
field. A brief review of two earlier periods may be helpful.
As of the mid-twentieth century, Chinese law simply did not ex-
ist as a discrete field of research in the West. Imperial legal codes
that governed Chinese dynasties reaching back to the seventh cen-
tury AD were un-translated; imperial Chinese legal institutions were
unstudied. True, historians did know of their existence. But the or-
thodox depiction in this "first wave" emphasized the relative
unimportance of legal institutions. "Law was subordinate to moral-
ity," according to the pithy 1948 summation by prominent China
historian John Fairbank.a7 3 Imperial law was viewed as primarily
penal in nature, and rarely applied with any rigor or consistency.
Under this narrative, private law simply did not exist in China. Busi-
ness dealings and transactions were instead handled according to
time-honored local Chinese customs and traditions.17"
Similar trends governed the study of the People's Republic of
China (PRC). During the decade after the founding of the modern
Chinese state in 1949, Western academic studies of PRC law were
almost non-existent. Communist authorities' closure of the nation to
all but a selected handful of foreigners certainly posed a practical
barrier. But the polarized ideological atmosphere in international po-
litical and academic circles of the time also fostered a view of Chinese
law as but a simple extension of Maoist political slogans. As one 1956
commentator noted, "[i]t is futile, therefore, to attempt any compara-
tive study of criminal law on the Chinese mainland, for there appears
to be no 'law' as we understand its meaning in the free world."175
China thus remained the classic Other. Its legal system was inscruta-
ble and impenetrable, operating on norms completely foreign to
Western scholars.
Beginning in the 1960s, this orthodox portrayal of the Chinese
legal system came under challenge by a "second wave" of scholarship.
Historians such as Derk Bodde, T'ung-Tsu Ch'ii, Clarence Morris,
173. JOHN FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 108 (1948).
174. Id., at 108-10.
175. Huai Ming Wang, Chinese and American Criminal Law, 46 J. OF CRIMINAL
LAW, CRIMINOLOGY, & POLITICAL SCIENCE 797 (1956). Of course, consistent with the
prevailing political biases of the time, not all Chinese law was dismissed. The author
continues, "Only the law now effective in Nationalist China has legal and historical
value, and it alone should be taken as a representation of real Chinese law." Id.
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and James Watt broke open Western academic understanding of the
imperial Chinese legal system with their detailed examinations of
Qing dynasty legal cases and imperial legal institutions.17 6 Full
translations of the imperial Chinese codes followed.' 77 Scholars such
as Philip Huang delved into local Chinese archives, demonstrating
that imperial Chinese civil disputes were not confined to informal
dispute resolution mechanisms. Rather, imperial Chinese magis-
trates found themselves confronted with a wide range of inheritance,
debt, and land claims, which they did not hesitate to resolve accord-
ing to relevant statutory law.' 7 8
Similar processes took place with regard to modern Chinese law.
Foreign scholars found that there was indeed law to study in main-
land China. Relying on interviews with mainland refugees in Hong
Kong, Jerome Cohen published the first casebook on Chinese crimi-
nal law in 1968 (thereby directly refuting the assertion advanced
twelve years earlier).179 Other scholars took full advantage of what
limited channels of access to the PRC existed for foreigners in the
1970s, attending events such as the semiannual Canton Trade Fair
to observe how Chinese businessmen resolved commercial disputes in
practice. Research and publications resulting from these activities
helped erode the myth of the Other that surrounded the Chinese le-
gal system.180 PRC legal institutions and practices came to be seen as
intelligible objects of study, albeit still very different from their for-
eign counterparts and subject to the political vagaries of a one-Party
state.
The onset of the reform period in China in 1978 shifted these
efforts into high gear. Chinese authorities sought to import laws and
institutions to facilitate economic growth. The opening of China to
the outside world made regular interactions possible. Exchange pro-
grams such as the Ford Foundation-funded Committee on Legal
Educational Exchanges in China brought Chinese legal scholars to
the United States for study during the 1980s. Beginning in the late
1990s, foreign governments began to directly fund rule-of-law
176. T'uNo-Tsu CH'C, LAw AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA (1961); DERK BODDE
& CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA (1967); JAMES WATT, THE DISTRICT MAG-
ISTRATE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (1972).
177. THE QING CODE (William Jones, trans., 1994); THE GREAT MING CODE (Jiang
Yonglin, trans., 2005).
178. HUANG, supra note 8, at 239-45.
179. JEROME COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
1949-1963 (1968).
180. As one foreign participant in the Canton Trade Fair summarized his exper-
iences, "Rather than being an area where lawyers have no role, trade with the
People's Republic of China is a significant area for legal activity, and a fit subject for
academic analysis." Roderick O'Brien, One Lawyer's View of Trade with the People's
Republic of China, 1 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS 91, 104 (1979).
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projects in China. 181 Many of these efforts, as well as the scholarship
they generated, emphasized the translation of foreign legal norms
and institutions and the transplantation of them to China. In the
case of U.S. government-funded programs, the purpose was openly
stated: to support the development of democratic institutions and po-
litical liberalization.18 2
But the reluctance of Chinese authorities to deepen legal reforms
and their continued hostility to political liberalization has led many
who pioneered research in Chinese law to question the fate of the
field.183 As Stan Lubman noted,
The search that I undertook forty years ago has changed, be-
cause China has undergone, and continues to be in the midst
of, remarkable transformations. There is an impressive
amount of Chinese law on the books now, and more will con-
tinue to appear. When I began, one question was whether
law could ever be a lens that could be useful for viewing and
deepening foreign understandings of China. The last twenty
five years of Chinese history provide a ready answer, but an-
other even more pointed question is present today: What is,
and what will be, the significance of law in the governance of
the Chinese Party-state?18 4
Since the 1990s, and partly in response to such questions, the
field of Chinese law has begun to experience a new wave of scholar-
ship. Some, such as Randall Peerenboom, question whether the
adoption of foreign legal norms is practical, or even normatively de-
sirable, given China's current political institutions and level of
economic development. 8 5 Such critiques are tightly interwoven with
arguments elsewhere in legal academia. These include critical analy-
ses by law and development scholars in Western academic circles,
and an ongoing debate inside China between scholars who seek to
deepen legal reform along Western lines (such as He Weifang) and
those who reject it (such as Zhu Suli). 8 6
There is yet another critique. It does not focus on normative
questions of whether China should adopt transplanted foreign legal
181. See, e.g., State Department Fact Sheet FY 1999-2000, available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/32893.htm.
182. Id. Similar assumptions appeared in academic literature as well. See, e.g.,
Larry Diamond, The Rule of Law as Transition to Democracy in China, in DEBATING
POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA: RuLE OF LAW Vs. DEMOCRATIZATION (Suisheng Zhao, ed.,
2006).
183. See, e.g., Jerome Cohen, China's Legal Reform at the Crossroads, FAR EAST-
ERN ECONOMIC REV. (Mar. 2006).
184. Lubman, supra note 119, at 92.
185. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES (2007).
186. For an argument (in English) along the latter lines, see Pan Wei, Toward a
Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, in DEBATING POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA,
supra note 182, at 32-40.
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norms. Rather, this critique emphasizes that extent to which China
has not done so in practice. Historians such as Philip Huang have
demonstrated that traditional Chinese judicial practices continue to
flourish in the People's Republic of China, notwithstanding the rup-
tures caused by the 1949 Communist revolution or the post-1978
effort by Chinese authorities to adopt formal Western law and
norms.' 87 Legal scholars such as Tom Ginsburg have emphasized the
extent to which foreign concepts such as judicial review have been
indigenized in practice in Taiwan and Korea, creating a form of "Con-
fucian constitutionalism." 8 8
This work collectively constitutes a "third wave" of scholarship
that is nuancing earlier depictions of Chinese legal reform. It calls
into question the extent to which Chinese law and legal institutions
have been, will be, or can be affected by foreign models. And it sug-
gests that China's own traditions and historical legacy will continue
to play a crucial role in determining the future course of reform.189
This Article fits squarely into this "third wave" of scholarship. It
emphasizes the importance of not simply examining the Chinese ver-
sions of institutions that foreign scholars are trained to look at when
they try to understand legal change in their own societies-such as
formal laws and regulations. Rather, it emphasizes the importance of
also examining those institutions that Chinese authorities them-
selves use to push legal and institutional change in their own
society-tools such as politicized "moral exemplar" study campaigns
and Communist Party personnel structures. Put aside the question of
whether one believes these instruments to be good or bad, appropri-
ate or inappropriate. If one's aim is to understand how China and its
legal system work, one has to look at them. And to date, they have
remained sadly understudied as constituent components of the Chi-
nese legal system.
This also opens up the question of what is actually moving legal
developments in China. If many of the shifts in judicial reform in
China over the past three decades can simply be attributed to lower
courts falling in line with the moral exemplar campaigns and per-
formance evaluations that are the flavor of the day (Try cases! Wait,
now mediate them!), how much do the vaunted national legislative or
regulatory reforms (say, with regard to evidentiary standards) actu-
ally matter? Perhaps they simply represent the partial and
incomplete detritus (coincidentally expressed in legal form) of much
187. See generally HUANG, supra note 8.
188. Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitu-
tional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 763 (2002).
189. Similar trends exist in other fields. See Richard Baum, Studies of Chinese
Politics in the United States, in CHINA WATCHING: PERSPECTIVES FROM EUROPE, JAPAN,
AND THE UNITED STATES (Robert Ash, David Shambaugh & Seiichiro Takagi eds.,
2006).
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more important Party implementation mechanisms. If that is true,
much of the focus on national law may be quite misplaced, and for-
eign scholars should be rewriting textbooks on Chinese law, focusing
much more on how local Party committees and organization bureaus
implement higher-level norms in practice.190
Some may instinctively reject this argument. The current main-
stream of Chinese legal scholarship (the "second wave") found its
roots in rejecting one-dimensional stereotypes of the Chinese legal
system (in the "first wave") as monolithic, unchanging, and weighted
by its imperial, Confucian, or Communist heritage. Consequently,
representatives of this "second wave" are sensitive towards argu-
ments that raise history or philosophy, perceiving in them the veiled
hint that China lacks "law," that its culture creates a barrier to the
import of legal institutions enjoyed by outsiders, or that Chinese peo-
ple deserve or seek anything less than the institutions enjoyed by
others.
But this Article is not reverting to the pre-1960s "first wave" de-
piction of the Chinese legal system. It does not portray China as an
enigmatic (or intimidating) Other to be contrasted with idealized eth-
nocentric fantasies of superior Western norms and practices. Nor
does it claim that China's historical and cultural legacy mandates
that it must follow a particular developmental track completely dif-
ferent from that of other countries. 9 1
Rather, this Article simply argues that we need to study China's
historical and institutional legacy because that is where Chinese au-
thorities have decided to take modern Chinese law. They are the ones
who are resurrecting Maoist dispute resolution practices. They are
the ones who are explicitly clothing judges in the mantle of Confucian
exemplars. And they are the ones who are relying on responsibility
systems rooted in Party and imperial bureaucratic practices to run
their country.
Chinese leaders are the ones who have turned against law. They
are the ones looking back to their past. And it is not certain how far
back they want to go.
190. Alternatively, national developments might be largely irrelevant. The appar-
ent shift of local Chinese court work from mediation to trial and back to mediation
may be nothing more than a highly evolved response by local officials to central pres-
sures-cooking the books and feeding higher authorities what they want to hear ("Get
your editing pen out, Zhang San, the boys upstairs want our work reports to show
more mediated cases this year.").
191. This Article does not claim that Chinese authorities' use of China's own insti-
tutional and cultural resources as a source for legal reform is normatively or
practically "better" or "more authentic" than foreign ones that "second wave" scholars
sought to bring to China. Party authorities are mobilizing China's own ideological and
institutional resources for an instrumental goal: to maintain their own control. As
discussed above, this self-interested short-term strategy may be generating signifi-
cant long-term costs for the nation at large.
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APPENDIX #1
"The Spirit of Chen Yanping is a Guide for Today's Judges"
Wang Mingzhuo, China Court Network - January 22, 2010
There is a cautious and conscientious judge in the Yangyuan Dis-
trict People's Court of Jingjiang Municipality, Jiangsu Province. She
has uncomplainingly given 14 years of her youth to trial work, re-
maining firmly rooted in the grassroots. She has meticulously
handled 3100 cases, without a single error, without a single com-
plaint, and without a single petition [i.e., from a disgruntled party],
winning the trust and praise of the local populace in her region ...
Today, following the public exposition of this judge's outstanding ac-
complishments in the media, her name will be sung throughout
China and carved into the monuments to the outstanding judges of
the People's Republic of China. She is a paragon among judges-"Na-
tional Model Judge Chen Yanping."
.. . Chen Yanping's sentiment for the people is the concentrated
embodiment of her true heart, true sentiment, and true love for the
people. Her spirit will undoubtedly become the guiding thought for
today's judges, leading other judges to carry out the sacred responsi-
bilities of "people's judges for the people" through their concrete
actions.
A true heart is a direct prerequisite for judges to serve the peo-
ple. As the steadfast guardian of last resort for completely and finally
resolving all grievances, judges only need to be like Chen Yanping
and have a true heart for the masses . . . If they draw close to the
masses, walk among the masses ... and feel the people's concerns as
their own ... they can construct a bridge serving the people and link-
ing judges and the people.
True sentiment is an effective means for judges to resolve con-
flict. True sentiment is the warmest thing on earth. It can melt hard
ice and resolve conflicts. For Chen Yanping, using sentiment to ex-
plain rational concepts, using sentiment to move people is the best
starting point to resolve conflicts. Judges should be like Chen Yanp-
ing, always hold true sentiment for the people, and always maintain
relations as close as flesh and blood with the people. They should
take cold legal opinions and mechanical procedures, infuse them with
judicial warmth and human concern, and transmit true sentiment to
every party that comes before them.
True love is the best method for judges to resolve the concerns of
the people . . . It is precisely because of Chen Yanping's true love for
the masses that she can root herself in 14 years of work in the basic-
level courts. It is precisely because she has true love for the masses
that she can win their trust and support. Moreover, it is because of
true love that she can shine her maternal radiance on disabled and
handicapped parties. For judges, only if they are like Chen Yanping,
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using love to go forward, resolving the concerns of the people, and
conscientiously carrying out their judicial duties, can justice for the
people truly be realized.
. .. Judges should follow the principle of "people's judges for the
people," absorb and carry on Chen Yanping's "True Heart, True Sen-
timent, True Love" spirit of service, wholeheartedly carry out the
work of hearing cases . . . and let the flame of justice and fairness
burn ever brighter with time.
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APPENDIX #2
"'An Exemplary Person Should Not Become a Vessel' -
The Judicial Wisdom of Chen Yanping"
Wang Zichen, Bulletin of the Supreme People's Court-
February 9, 2010
The Analects (Book Two) states "Confucius said: 'An exemplary
person Uunzil should not become a vessel."' In today's era, where so-
cial conflicts are exceedingly complex and the duties of judges
exceedingly strenuous, Chen Yanping perfectly incarnates the mean-
ing of this phrase through the reality of her work as a basic-level
judge. From the perspective of the judiciary, this phrase can be un-
derstood as saying that a judge with good moral conduct cannot
simply be a tool that mechanistically applies the law in the process of
handling cases. Rather, a judge must grasp social conditions, be well-
versed in all forms of judicial skills, be good at resolving disputes,
and amply bring into play the utility of the judiciary as a good de-
fender of the social order.
"An exemplary person should not become a vessel" first requires
that a judge should be an exemplary person [funzi]. An exemplary
person is a moral exemplar. Naturally, a judge as an exemplary per-
son must thus have good professional and personal integrity. In a
rule-of-law society, judges do not only operate the practical machin-
ery of law and ensure the efficient operation of society's mechanisms.
They are also seen as the guardians of legal order and social justice.
The rule-of-law environment for all of society depends to a great ex-
tent on their spirit and attitude toward the law. For this reason, it is
particularly important that a judge have good moral conduct. Chen
Yanping frequently says: "A lawsuit is but a once in a lifetime event,
but the effects of a lawsuit will last all ones' life. As a judge, if I can-
not fairly administer justice, then I have dishonored the solemn
national emblem above me, and I have dishonored the ordinary
masses below me who come seeking the law."
Chen Yanping once handled a case in which the plaintiff heard
that the defendant was a village cadre and was a good friend with
Chen Yanping's husband. As a result, the plaintiff feared that the
case would not be handled fairly. But in short order, the decision in
the case was handed down, the defendant lost, and the court's judg-
ment was quickly carried out. In the 21 years of her judicial career,
Chen Yanping has never accepted a gift from a party, and has never
handled (or intervened) in a single case as a result of her personal
relations or feelings.
"An exemplary person should not become a vessel" emphasizes
that an exemplary person should not be limited to a single strength.
They should not develop themselves to be a household utensil of lim-
ited utility. In historical periods when skills and reason were highly
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valued, judges were regarded as craftsmen. So, for judges guided by
the concept of Socialist Rule-of-Law, how should they fully bring to
play their technical role to satisfy popular demands and expecta-
tions? Judges should not be legal craftsmen who pay excessive
attention to wording, believe the laws of statutes to be the only scrip-
ture, and pay no attention to social harmony and the popular
interest. Even less should they be the kind of people who play with
the law and abuse their power, using law as an evil weapon to help
the tiger [i.e., evil people] pounce on his victims.
Through practice, Chen Yanping has cultivated many skills and
developed an effective work style. She not only has paid attention to
studying the local dialect and understanding local customs and atti-
tudes, she also frequently takes legal language and translates it into
the local dialect, allowing local residents to understand the point im-
mediately. In order to blend in with the ordinary people, she works at
grasping the mood of villagers, and she has learned to use "humani-
tarian" methods of executing the law to win the hearts of the people.
In studying Chen Yanping, one should devote particular attention to
research on experiences and skills accumulated by judges over time
via practice, and which have guiding value for the judiciary, and
spread the "Chen Yanping work style" far and wide.
The commentaries on the Book of Changes say: "The higher form
[of understanding] is what we call the Way, the lower form [of under-
standing] is what we call a tool." One goal of judges' work is deciding
cases and [completely] solving problems. But some judges only apply
the lower form of understanding to the concept of "deciding cases and
[completely] solving problems." They take their only goal that parties
don't complain after cases have been handled, and they exalt media-
tion rates as the most important target to use in evaluating judges
performance. Chen Yanping views the concept of "deciding cases and
[completely] solving problems" as requiring values inspired by the
higher form of understanding-completely resolving the case does
not simply mean that the parties do not complain.
In the past, Chen Yanping has used plain language to incisively
explain this [concept]. After one particular case was mediated to con-
clusion, one of the lawyers asked Chen Yanping-"This case would
have been really easy to decide via adjudication. Why did you insist
on mediating it?" Chen Yanping said, "The plaintiffs mother and fa-
ther passed away a long time ago, leaving only the father's younger
brother [presumably the defendant in the case]. To be sure, the griev-
ances between the two of them are deep. But by diligently uncovering
the crux of their grievances, and by reawakening their familial feel-
ings for one another, the conflict is very easily resolved. If I tried to
save time by issuing a verdict, the case would be finished, but the
conflict would remain, and the dispute would emerge yet again. It is
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even possible that problems would escalate, the dispute would inten-
sify, and a small grievance would become deep hatred. If a civil case
becomes a criminal one, the result would be even more serious. That
would be a situation where the case was decided, yet the issue was
not."
We are currently in an era of legal transformation. Judges stand
where the wind and waves are the strongest. Each step forward for
rule-of-law in China has the deep official mark of scholars and legis-
lators who have deeply thought about the issues. Even more, it has
the solid judicial foundation of judges' work in practice. Chen Yanp-
ing is worthy of this great era. Under the guidance of the concept of
"Socialist Rule-of-Law with Chinese Characteristics," she has contin-
ually improved her skills and self-cultivation. With the values and
spirit appropriate for a judge, she has sought opportunities for the
rule of law to grow where the soil for it is traditionally weak, and she
has made her own contribution to upholding fairness and justice. We
hope that the judicial philosophy of "An exemplary person should not
become a vessel" will become the motto for even more judges engaged
in resolving social conflicts.
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